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 David has been “singled out.” He is the only one in his neigh-
borhood legally prohibited from building a house.  In a town full 
of residences, his lot alone must remain vacant.  This is unequal, 
but is it unconstitutional? 
 Courts have continually grappled with this sort of question, vig-
ilantly defending against unfair and unjust singling out.  So im-
portant is this concern that the Supreme Court has emphasized it 
as the heart of the Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, and an 
entire Equal Protection doctrine has emerged around it. 
 However, courts and scholars have yet to critically examine the 
concept of singling-out, and as a result, singling-out protections 
languish as ineffective and counterproductive.  This Article reme-
dies the oversight and presents a solution. 
 By untangling the different singling-out theories, this Article pri-
oritizes the approaches that best serve their underlying values.  
Moreover, this Article proposes an easily implementable, though 
counterintuitive, measure for improving both singling-out protec-
tions and Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It’s discrimination.  David is the only one in his neighborhood legally 
prohibited from building a house. In a town full of residences, his lot must 
remain vacant.1  All his neighbors can build on their land, but he cannot build 
on his. 
Grace suffers similar treatment regarding her water service.  Her munic-
ipality has decreed that Grace must pay double what her neighbors do for 
their water connections.2  This is not based on the amount of water Grace 
uses; the fee is simply for a connection.  Grace must pay twice as much for 
the exact same service. 
David and Grace have been “singled out.”  The law subjects them to 
restrictions and costs that their neighbors do not bear.  It’s discrimination.  
But is it impermissible discrimination?  It is paramountly inequitable, but is 
it unconstitutional? 
                                                          
 1.  Facts adapted from the case of David Lucas.  See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 2.  Facts adapted from the case of Grace Olech.  See generally Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
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Thousands of cases, ranging from the Supreme Court to lower federal 
and state courts, have asked these questions, expressing the same core con-
cern about individuals being unfairly singled out to bear government-im-
posed burdens.3  The inquiry is most common in the Fifth Amendment tak-
ings jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court identified the singling-out 
fairness concern as the very heart of the takings doctrine.4  Additionally, ech-
oes of the singling-out inquiry reverberate into Equal Protection5 and Due 
Process6 cases, leading to the emergence of the “class-of-one” doctrine.7 
Across all these cases, courts rally to the cause of “fairness and justice.”8  
They seek to protect individuals who find themselves victims of unfair gov-
ernment action, and they police against individual discrimination,9 govern-
ment illegitimacy,10 the mischief of special-interest factions,11 or majoritarian 
tyranny.12  In service of such foundational values, the singling-out inquiry 
has given rise to powerful judicial rhetoric—unanimously embraced, thor-
oughly rehearsed, and widely reprinted.13  When it comes to singling out, the 
concern is intuitive, the principles are fundamental, and the language is well 
worn. 
However, the singling-out inquiry itself has not been well examined.  
Aside from broadly agreeing on the importance of fairness and justice, jurists 
and scholars have paid little attention to the details of how singling-out in-
quiries actually advance their underlying goals.  This Article probes these 
important, unexamined details and finds both a striking imprecision in what 
courts mean by “singling out,” as well as a perverse mismatch between the 
singling-out concerns and the measures taken to address them.  The primary 
method courts use to control singling out is a property-based approach un-
dertaken through the Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.  However, this 
Article argues that this approach proves poorly suited to some singling-out 
concerns, outright self-defeating of others, and detrimental to the implemen-
tation of the takings doctrine.  The secondary protection against singling out 
embraces an arbitrariness-based approach, typified by the Equal Protection 
                                                          
 3.  For one early example, see Nashville Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935).  For a fuller 
description see discussion infra Part I.B. 
 4.  See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 5.  See, e.g., Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 
 6.  See infra note 46 (discussing “spot-zoning” cases). 
 7.  See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 8.  See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 9.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 148–49 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 10.  See, e.g., Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (citing Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 
(7th Cir. 1998)). 
 11.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Colonial Press ed., 1901); Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 12.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 44 (James Madison). 
 13.  See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
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“class-of-one” doctrine.14  This Article contends that this approach is actually 
well suited to address the core singling-out concern, but it is underdeveloped 
and may suffer from the courts’ primary investment of attention in the prop-
erty-based approach. 
In light of these shortcomings, this Article recommends refining these 
protections to better align them with the goals of the singling-out inquiry.  
The prescription for doing so is counterintuitive: this Article posits that by 
removing singling-out language from the takings inquiry, the Court can not 
only improve singling-out protection, in both the property-based and arbitrar-
iness-based doctrines, but it can also clarify the takings jurisprudence. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces the core values that 
animate the singling-out concern, as well as the property-based and arbitrar-
iness-based approaches that courts have used to address singling out.  Part II 
examines the nature of singling out more precisely, finding that under the 
concept of singling out, courts make four distinct inquiries: 1) arbitrary dis-
crimination, 2) inequality of results, 3) magnitude of burdens, and 4) distrib-
utive social justice.  It then assesses these different inquiries for consistency 
with the core singling-out concerns.  In light of these observations, Part III 
reexamines the singling-out doctrines, arguing that the property-based ap-
proach actually misses the most important singling-out inquiries and per-
versely encourages arbitrary government action, facilitates factional mis-
chief, and incentivizes detrimental land management.  As such, the property-
based approach works against both the principles of the singling-out concern 
and the administration of the takings doctrine.  Part III further determines that 
the arbitrariness-based approach responds well to core singling-out concerns, 
but it suffers from a lack of development.  Based on this analysis, Part IV 
recommends expressly eliminating the singling-out language from the tak-
ings inquiry to improve the function of both the property-based and arbitrar-
iness-based approaches, as well as the takings doctrine more generally.  Part 
IV also draws upon Supreme Court precedent to detail how the Court might 
accomplish this change. 
I.  THE SINGLING OUT CONCERN 
Though frequently articulated, the concern with singling out has been 
underscrutinized.  Unlike many other constitutional protections, the singling-
out concern is not necessarily tied to specific constitutional guarantees (such 
as free speech),15 fundamental rights (such as voting),16 or systematically dis-
advantaged groups (such as “discrete and insular minorities”).17  So, it bears 
                                                          
 14.  See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 
 15.  E.g. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16.  E.g. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 17.  E.g. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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asking: why and how do courts police singling out?  This Part examines those 
issues.  Section A addresses the “why” question, rooting the singling-out con-
cern in government legitimacy and political process values.  Section B then 
examines “how” by discussing the doctrines employed to police singling out.  
The primary approach courts have taken is a property-based protection 
against singling out, grounded in the Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.  
Courts have also, though less frequently, addressed singling out through an 
arbitrariness-based approach typified by the Equal Protection class-of-one 
doctrine.  Together these Sections provide a foundation for assessing the ef-
fectiveness of these doctrines as measured against the justifications for the 
singling-out concern. 
A.  What’s Wrong with Singling Out? 
The protections against singling out arise from a concern for the legiti-
macy of government and a worry about the victimization of individuals at the 
hands of powerful majorities or factions.  These anxieties date back to the 
framing of the Constitution.  The Framers recognized these risks and sought 
to structure government to prevent majorities or particularly influential inter-
est groups from treating themselves preferentially or their enemies detrimen-
tally.18  To avoid such abuses, the Constitution reflects a strong preference 
for the general applicability of laws: “for example, the Bill of Attainder 
Clauses prohibit certain types of laws that single out individuals for punish-
ment without trial; [and] more generally, the Equal Protection Clause mani-
fests the principle that the law ought to treat like cases alike.”19 
Drawing upon these roots, more modern jurists base singling-out con-
cerns on the same principles that government action should not be wielded 
as a tyranny of the majority nor be co-opted to serve the whim of powerful 
interests.  For example, Justice Stevens identified the concerns underlying 
singling out as preventing the “mischiefs of factions”20 or other “opportunis-
tic highjacking of the political process to benefit some special interest.”21  
                                                          
 18.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–49, 51, supra note 11, at 271–284, 289–93 (James Madison); 
John Hart Ely, Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of 
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 344 (1962) (“A careful reading of Federalists 47, 48, 49 and 
51 reveals that usurpation on the part of the legislature was what worried Madison and Hamilton 
most.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 19.  Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 628 (2014); see 
also Ely, supra note 18, at 348 (“It is the peculiar province of the legislature, to prescribe general 
rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would 
seem to be the duty of other departments.” (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 
(1810))). 
 20.  See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (G. Wills, ed. 1982)). 
 21.  John D. Echeverria, The Triumph of Justice Stevens and the Principle of Generality, 7 VT. 
J. ENVTL. L. 22, 24 (2006). 
PappasFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  10:22 AM 
2016] SINGLED OUT 127 
Then-Justice Rehnquist articulated a similar theory highlighting the majori-
tarian “discrimination” that could result from the many imposing concen-
trated costs on the few.22 
Commentators too, particularly in the Fifth Amendment takings context, 
have consistently grounded the singling-out principle in terms of governmen-
tal legitimacy and functional political process.23  Moreover, scholars have 
more broadly asserted that general applicability is necessary to give laws the 
moral authority and legitimacy that lead societies and individuals to respect 
law as law.24  For example, Lon Fuller has specifically tied the idea of general 
applicability of laws to a “principle of fairness” that is key to the morality 
and legitimacy of law.25 
Thus, the consistent theme, from the Framers, jurists, and scholars, is 
that general applicability of laws is necessary both to legitimate government 
and to prevent political process abuses such as factional mischief and majori-
tarian tyranny.  These are the foundational principles on which the singling-
out concern rests. 
B.  Approaches to Singling Out 
The Court takes two approaches to policing singling out. The more com-
mon, property-based approach is pursued through the Fifth Amendment tak-
ings jurisprudence.  This provides the most frequent articulation of the sin-
gling-out concern as well as the most robust language to underscore it.  
Accordingly, it can be considered the primary approach.  The Court’s other 
method of policing singling out follows an arbitrariness-based approach, ex-
emplified by the infrequently deployed Equal Protection class-of-one doc-
trine. 
1.  The Property-Based Approach 
The primary means of policing singling out comes in the context of the 
Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, which announces singling-out con-
cepts as a means for determining whether government regulation amounts to 
a compensable taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. 
                                                          
 22.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 148–49 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 23.  See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
24–28 (2008) (summarizing scholarly views). 
 24.  See J.R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 32 (1980) (“A legal system must satisfy certain conditions if 
it is to count as a legal system at all: the laws must be generally known, and for the most part be of 
general application . . . .”); see also LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41–44 (rev. ed. 1969) 
(identifying general applicability as part of the “morality that makes law possible”). 
 25.  See FULLER, supra note 24, at 47. 
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The Fifth Amendment guarantees “private property [shall not] be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”26  In the Fifth Amendment regu-
latory takings context, courts inquire whether a government action suffi-
ciently interferes with property expectations such that the government must 
compensate the property owner for a “taking” of private property.27  From 
the earliest articulation of this doctrine, the core question for identifying such 
a taking has been whether government action goes “too far” in limiting prop-
erty expectations.28  The challenge for courts evaluating these cases “has 
been—and remains—how to discern how far is ‘too far.’”29 
Courts have announced singling-out inquiries as indications that gov-
ernment action has gone too far, and though the precise means for applying 
these inquiries have never been clearly delineated, courts tend to introduce 
the singling-out concept to the takings inquiry in three ways.  First, courts 
have applied the singling-out question as an overarching principle and gen-
eral tenet of takings law, almost synonymous with the “too far” question.30  
In doing so, courts rely on both express use of the wording “singled out” as 
well as the oft-quoted expression that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . 
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole.”31  This articulation is frequently termed the Armstrong prin-
ciple, after the case coining the language, but the same sentiment has also 
been phrased as asking if “individuals are singled out to bear the cost of ad-
vancing the public convenience.”32 
Second, courts have incorporated singling-out concepts into the balanc-
ing test set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York33 
(“Penn Central test”), which is the primary method for analyzing whether a 
government action amounts to a regulatory taking.34  In applying the Penn 
Central test, courts examine three factors: “(1) ‘the economic impact’ of the 
government action, (2) the extent to which the action ‘interferes with distinct 
                                                          
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 27.  See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). 
 30.  See, e.g., Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012); 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001); Nollan v. Cal-
ifornia Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987). 
 31.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 32.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 148 n.11 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Nashville Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935)). 
 33.  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 34.  See id. at 123–28; John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 171, 186–99 (2005). 
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investment-backed expectations,’ and (3) the ‘character’ of the action.”35  
Sometimes courts have incorporated the singling-out idea into this final fac-
tor analyzing the character of government action.36 
Third, courts have indicated that the singling-out principle is a stand-
alone takings test that may be used in parallel to the Penn Central balancing 
test.  For example, the Supreme Court has stated that in conducting the tak-
ings analysis it examines either (1) the “magnitude or character of the burden 
a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights” or (2) “how any 
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners.”37  The first ques-
tion is essentially the Penn Central test, particularly the first two factors in-
quiring into economic diminution and interference with expectation.  This 
second question examining the distribution of burdens recasts the singling-
out inquiry and the Armstrong principle as a self-contained takings test.38 
Taking these variations together, the Supreme Court, lower federal 
courts, and state courts have announced this singling-out concept in thou-
sands of takings cases.  One of the most enduring articulations has been the 
specific wording of the Armstrong principle,39 particularly that the “Fifth 
Amendment[] . . . was designed to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”40  Since Armstrong, “[t]his language . . . has 
been endorsed in almost every important takings opinion of the last thirty 
years,”41 and in quoting Armstrong, the Court has emphasized this principle 
                                                          
 35.  Echeverria, supra note 34, at 171 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124); see also id. at 
186–99; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123–28, 130. 
 36.  See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (declaring “the nature of 
the governmental action in this case is quite unusual” because the statute “singles out certain em-
ployers”); B & G Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 662 F.3d 233, 262–63 
(3d Cir. 2011) (discussing “fundamental principles of fairness” and singling out in the context of 
the “nature of the governmental action” analysis); Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 
1028 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc on other grounds, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
the “more frequently applied iteration of the ‘character of the governmental action’ test considers 
whether the challenged regulation places a high burden on a few private property owners” (citing 
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49)); cf. Echeverria, supra note 34, at 192–93 (noting that the third factor in 
the Penn Central test has been interpreted in a number of ways, including as an inquiry into the 
general applicability of laws). 
 37.  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). 
 38.  See id. at 544.  In criticizing the claimant’s failure to articulate a cognizable takings claim 
in Lingle, the Court stated that “[i]n short, Chevron has not clearly argued—let alone established—
that it has been singled out to bear any particularly severe regulatory burden,” implying that “sin-
gling out” is the operable crux of a colorable takings claim.  Id. 
 39.  See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
 40.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 41.  Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1534 (2006). 
PappasFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  10:22 AM 
130 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:122 
as the central guiding concept for its takings jurisprudence.42  Regardless of 
slight variations in wording, the questions of singling out landowners, forcing 
some property owners alone to bear public burdens, or distributing the bur-
dens of regulation all reflect the same basic concern with distribution of bur-
dens and singling out. 
Moreover, not only has this singling-out concept appeared in many tak-
ings opinions, but it also has been used “both by Justices who contended that 
the regulations before the Court amounted to takings, as well as by those who 
disagreed,”43 so much so that “[t]he parroting of this [sentiment] by judges, 
both sympathetic and hostile to property owners’ claims, has become almost 
a joke.”44  Further, the singling-out focus is common across ideology as well 
as case outcome, with Justices from across the political and philosophical 
spectrum equally willing to incorporate the singling-out language or the Arm-
strong principle.45  All together, this singling-out language in the takings 
cases offers the most consistently articulated and hortatorily robust singling-
out approach. 
2.  The Arbitrariness-Based Approach 
An alternate means of protecting individuals from being singled out in-
volves inquiries directly into the existence of arbitrary discrimination, and 
the Equal Protection class-of-one doctrine provides a primary example of 
protections under this model.46 
                                                          
 42.  See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).  For additional discussion 
of the Armstrong principle and its role in the Court’s takings jurisprudence, see generally Michael 
Pappas, The Armstrong Evolution, 76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 35 (2016).  
 43.  Ball & Reynolds, supra note 41, at 1534; see also Davidson, supra note 23, at 21 (noting 
that the fairness concept has been “embraced in a long line of modern regulatory takings cases ”). 
 44.  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261, 1286 
(2000). 
 45.  See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 41, at 1534; William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong 
Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 
1153 (1997). 
 46.  A related arbitrariness-based inquiry arises in “spot-zoning” cases where courts have in-
validated land use decisions that arbitrarily single out individual landowners for treatment different 
than their neighbors.  See generally Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, Determination Whether Zoning 
or Rezoning of Particular Parcel Constitutes Illegal Spot Zoning, 73 A.L.R. 5th 223 (1999).  See 
also Strain v. Mims, 193 A. 754 (Conn. 1937); Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 172 N.E. 
710 (Ill. 1930); Mueller v. Hoffmeister Undertaking & Livery Co., 121 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1938); 
Linden Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Linden, 173 A. 593 (N.J. 1934); Page v. City of 
Portland, 165 P.2d 280, 284 (Or. 1946); Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 292 N.W. 320, 323 
(Wis. 1940); cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978) (“But, 
contrary to appellants’ suggestions, landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or ‘reverse spot,’ 
zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less 
favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.”). 
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The Equal Protection Clause’s promise that no state shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”47 provides a 
fitting textual root for a constitutional guarantee against being singled out.48  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the clause not only guards against 
government classifications based on race, sex, or other immutable character-
istics49 but also protects individuals from arbitrary treatment by the govern-
ment.  This protection stems from the Supreme Court’s recognition that “suc-
cessful equal protection claims [may be] brought by a ‘class of one,’ where 
the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from 
others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.”50 
This class-of-one protection was announced in Village of Willowbrook 
v. Olech,51 which arose from Ms. Olech’s attempt to connect her property to 
a municipal water supply.52  The municipality conditioned the connection on 
her granting a thirty-three-foot easement, despite requiring only a fifteen-foot 
easement from other property owners seeking similar connections.53  Ms. 
Olech claimed that the municipality’s demand of the additional eighteen-feet 
of easement was irrational and arbitrary, motivated by retaliatory animus 
from an unrelated lawsuit she had filed.54  The Court found this sufficient to 
support a claim for Equal Protection relief, recognizing that arbitrary discrim-
ination is invalid regardless of whether animus is involved.55 
In announcing this protection from “arbitrary individual administrative 
decision[s] by a government official,”56 Olech established a constitutional 
guarantee against arbitrary singling out.  However, the class-of-one doctrine 
has received little subsequent development.  Since Olech was decided in 
2000, lower courts have struggled to apply it,57 and the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
 47.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 48.  See Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 78 WASH. L. REV. 367, 379 (2003) (“The alternate view of equal protection focuses, not on 
limiting governmental classifications, but on protecting individual rights.  This view of equal pro-
tection has an obvious contextual basis; the Fourteenth Amendment itself provides that no state shall 
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Thompson, supra note 
44, at 1287 (“Even assuming that the Constitution embodies some notion of horizontal equity . . . 
the Equal Protection Clause would seem a more logical basis than the takings protections for en-
forcing it . . . .”). 
 49.  See generally, Farrell, supra note 48, at 379. 
 50.  See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 563. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 565. 
 56.  Farrell, supra note 48, at 400 n.238. 
 57.  For a description of the “doctrinal morass” that is the current class-of-one doctrine, see 
Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1043 (10th Cir. 
2007) (McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Alex M. Hagen, Mixed 
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heard only one class-of-one case, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agri-
culture,58 holding that the government could not be liable on a class-of-one 
theory in the employment context.  As a result, this arbitrariness-based ap-
proach is less commonly invoked and may be considered secondary to the 
property-based approach to singling out. 
II.  WHAT EXACTLY IS SINGLING OUT, ANYWAY? 
For all the concern with singling out, the term is thrown around loosely, 
even in the doctrines aimed to address it.  To date, neither courts nor com-
mentators have examined precisely what singling out means.  Rather they 
have assumed use of the term as a general, unitary concept.  However, as 
Section A discusses, a more precise examination of singling-out concepts re-
veals that case law and scholarship support at least four different views of 
what singling out means, not all of which raise the same worry over govern-
ment illegitimacy or political process failures.  Building on this more nuanced 
view of singling out, Section B then assesses which types of singling out res-
onate most closely with the legitimacy justification underlying the singling-
out concern. 
A.  Identifying the Different Types of Singling Out 
The treatment of singling out in case law and scholarship supports at 
least four potential types of singling out: 1) arbitrary discrimination, 2) ine-
quality of results from non-arbitrary, generally applicable laws, 3) magnitude 
of individual regulatory burdens, and 4) distributive social justice of burdens.  
Each are considered in turn.59 
                                                          
Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Discourse, and Judicial Function in Class-of-One 
Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L. REV. 197, 206–07 (2013) (“[T]he class-of-one landscape is 
fractious and unsettled and will remain so unless the Supreme Court weighs in on this issue.”). 
 58.  553 U.S. 591 (2008). 
 59.  The examples in the following Subsections are stylized to help separate and probe the dif-
ferent types of singling out.  This simplification is useful for isolating variables that inform singling 
out concerns but, admittedly, the complexities of reality may not follow such clear lines.  Cf. Ely, 
supra note 18, at 350 (“Of course the distinction between rules of general applicability and the 
application of such rules to particular persons or groups is not a clear one.”).  For example, a regu-
latory burden of particularly great magnitude, that only impacts a few individuals, may evidence 
arbitrary discrimination.  Alternatively, a seemingly non-arbitrary law may in fact have arisen from 
political process failure but still have some rational justification for unequal results.  Such matters 
of fact will always be difficult to resolve and lead to complex cases, but the simplified hypotheticals 
at least offer a starting point for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing the different forms of sin-
gling out. 
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1.  Arbitrary Government Discrimination 
Arbitrary government discrimination among individuals is the prototyp-
ical example of problematic singling out, and it represents the most immedi-
ate worry for courts seeking to police government legitimacy.  As a stylized 
example, imagine individual X is required to pay twice as much as all other 
residents for a government service, such as connecting to a municipal sewer 
or obtaining a driver’s license.  Imagine further that no facts justify the dif-
ference in price and that individual X is otherwise similarly situated to all her 
neighbors. 
Such a situation is obviously just a small variation on the facts of Olech60 
and is the type of singling out addressed directly by the class-of-one doc-
trine.61  This arbitrary discrimination strikes at the core of the singling-out 
worry because X appears to be victimized by a non-generally applicable law 
that smacks of illegitimate government action produced by political process 
failure.  Moreover, such a specifically targeted law also appears to lack moral 
legitimacy.62  One might say that this law is both unfair and unequal, and it 
is exactly the type of abuse that the singling-out concern seeks to guard 
against. 
2.  Inequality of Results 
In addition to patently arbitrary discrimination, instances of singling out 
can also arise from non-arbitrary government actions that cause unequal re-
sults based on dissimilar individual situations.  For example, imagine another 
stylized hypothetical, in which a municipality requires all citizens with multi-
bathroom homes to pay a greater fee for municipal sewer connections be-
cause the multi-bathroom homes require larger, more complicated connec-
tions than do single-bathroom homes.  Or, imagine a municipality requires 
citizens obtaining commercial driver’s licenses to pay a greater fee than those 
obtaining standard driver’s licenses because of the additional certification 
processes required. 
These are seemingly rational and generally applicable laws, but facts 
may arise under which they single out some small number of individuals, 
causing inequality of results.  For example, if only one resident of the munic-
ipality owns a multi-bathroom home, then she has to pay $100 for the sewer 
tie-in while all other residents pay only $50.  Similarly, if only one resident 
of the municipality wishes to drive commercially, then she must pay $100 for 
the driver’s license whereas all other residents would only pay $50. 
                                                          
 60.  See Olech, 528 U.S. at 563–64. 
 61.  Id.  Moreover, such arbitrariness also raises the particular concerns noted by Justice Ste-
vens in his takings jurisprudence.  See Echeverria, supra note 21, at 24. 
 62.  See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 24, at 47. 
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In both cases there is singling out based on the inequality of results from 
a generally applicable law.  However, these cases do not necessarily, or even 
likely, evidence government illegitimacy or factional mischief.63  Though not 
all residents pay an equal amount, the differential fees appear justified by 
increased costs, and the higher fees are still relatively small in magnitude.  So 
this singling out based on inequality of results appears less worrisome.  It 
does not suggest obvious political process defects or illegitimacy of the law. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s singling-out language in the takings 
context suggests that it will police this inequality-of-results singling out.  Par-
ticularly, the Court’s statements that it will base a takings determination on 
“how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners,”64 or that 
it will find a taking if “individuals are singled out to bear the cost of advanc-
ing the public convenience,”65 suggest that such inequality of results would 
require takings compensation, regardless of the rationality and general ap-
plicability of the laws.  This language may overstate the extent to which 
courts actually find takings based on inequality of results,66 but it nonetheless 
is repeated frequently and impacts not only courts’ but also landowners’ and 
agencies’ interpretation of the takings inquiry.67 
3.  Magnitude of Individual Burden 
A third stylized hypothetical set of laws illustrates how a non-arbitrary, 
generally applicable government action might raise political process or legit-
imacy concerns based on the magnitude of the burden that it imposes.  If there 
is an excessively high burden imposed on certain individuals, it may indicate 
some form of government illegitimacy.  This magnitude-of-burdens worry is 
at the heart of the Court’s takings jurisprudence, but, strictly speaking, it does 
not actually require that any individual be singled out. 
For example, imagine if only one resident of a municipality owns a 
multi-bathroom home and has to pay $50,000 for a sewer connection while 
all other residents, owners of single-bathroom homes, pay $50.  Alterna-
tively, imagine if only one resident wishes to drive commercially and has to 
pay $50,000 for a driver’s license whereas all other residents only pay $50 
for a standard license.  In such cases, individuals are singled out not only 
                                                          
 63.  One could imagine, however, a scenario where the unequal treatment of the multi-bath-
room homeowner or commercial driver was the result of intentional victimization or some majori-
tarian or factional animus.  If there were facts to prove this and no other justification for the in-
creased cost, then this scenario would fit in with the arbitrary government discrimination 
hypothetical.  See supra Part II.A.I. 
 64.  Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 65.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 148 n.11 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Nashville Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1935)). 
 66.  See discussion infra Part III.A.4. 
 67.  See discussion infra Part III.A.4. 
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through inequality of results but also by the magnitude of the burdens they 
bear, which are one thousand times as much as other residents’ burdens in 
this instance.68 
Under these two sets of facts, one may be highly concerned about the 
legitimacy of the law and the political process that led to such a great burden 
on the multi-bathroom homeowner or the commercial driver—perhaps even 
more so than under an inequality-of-results perspective discussed in the pre-
vious subsection.  The fact that this situation is more problematic than the 
inequality-of-results hypothetical demonstrates an important distinction: it is 
the magnitude of the burden, rather than the inequality of results, that more 
strongly signals potentially illegitimate government action. Between this and 
the previous Subsection’s hypothetical, the unequal distribution of result is 
held constant, but the magnitude of the burden changes from a two-times 
differential to a thousand-times differential.  If the thousand-times differen-
tial raises an even more urgent concern over the legitimacy of government 
action, that indicates that unacceptably high burdens rather than inequality of 
results that raises, or at least amplifies, that concern.  
Certainly the imposition of a great burden on a very few individuals may 
cause concern because it triggers a greater intuition of arbitrariness or fac-
tional mischief, which might occasion a closer look into whether the high 
magnitude of the burden was in fact rational or instead arbitrary.  But, if a 
burden of great magnitude is not arbitrary, then the concern arises more from 
the absolute magnitude of the burden than from the inequality of results.  If 
this is the case, then the concern about the magnitude of the burden is not 
accurately described as a singling-out concern because it does not require any 
particular “singling.”  It can impact many individuals, or even a majority of 
individuals, and still be too great in magnitude.  This does not diminish the 
nature of the concern, particularly in regard to interference with property 
rights; rather, it clarifies the appropriate question to ask.  An enormous bur-
den is worrisome, whether imposed on many (thus leading to suspicion of 
factional mischief), or on few (thus leading to suspicion of majoritarian tyr-
anny). 
For example, even if a large percentage of residents, say, seventy-five 
percent of residents rather than just one, were required to pay $50,000 for 
their sewer connections or driver’s licenses, there would persist a concern 
                                                          
 68.  For simplicity of example, the hypothetical stipulates that this law is non-arbitrary but does 
not provide a justification for why not.  In reality, if the magnitude of a burden is great and lacks 
facts to justify it, that would likely indicate arbitrariness or factional mischief.  However, a great 
magnitude of burden in and of itself does not necessarily indicate arbitrariness.  For example, the 
landmark regulation at issue in Penn Central imposed a great magnitude of burden but was not 
adjudged to be an arbitrary action or a taking.  See generally Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132–33. 
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that the burden of the regulation was simply too great in magnitude and some-
how reflected a political process defect (possibly outsized influence by those 
paying only $50), regardless of the breadth of its applicability. 
If this is true and the magnitude of the burden is in fact the key variable 
driving worry over government legitimacy in a given case, then this situation 
is less a matter of singling out (such as differential treatment of individuals 
manifested in inequality of results) than it is of diminished property value 
(such as amount of imposed cost manifested in magnitude of burdens).  
This point may help clarify Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central, 
which articulates a singling-out concern that, though expressed in terms of 
inequality of results, appears motivated by magnitude-of-burden suspicion.  
In arguing that a regulation preventing Penn Central from developing a sky-
scraper above Grand Central Station amounted to a taking, Justice Rehnquist 
stressed the magnitude of the cost.  Particularly, he emphasized that Penn 
Central was singled out because it bore a multimillion-dollar burden but re-
ceived no offsetting benefit.69 As Justice Rehnquist put it: 
 If the cost of preserving Grand Central Terminal were spread 
evenly across the entire population of the city of New York, the 
burden per person would be in cents per year—a minor cost appel-
lees would surely concede for the benefit accrued.  Instead, how-
ever, appellees would impose the entire cost of several million dol-
lars per year on Penn Central.  But it is precisely this sort of 
discrimination that the Fifth Amendment prohibits.70 
Though Justice Rehnquist’s analysis is framed in terms of a discrimina-
tory singling out, it repeatedly emphasizes the enormity of the multimillion-
dollar cost imposed on Penn Central, and this large burden seems to drive his 
analysis as much as anything.  For example, to adjust the facts and para-
phrase, if the regulation imposed “the entire cost of [one-hundred dollars] 
per year on Penn Central,” then “this sort of discrimination” would be more 
likely “a minor cost” that did not trouble sensitivities toward singling out.71  
Such is the importance of magnitude. 
As with Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central, much of the sin-
gling-out language in the takings context can be described more precisely as 
concern over magnitude of burdens rather than over inequality of results.  For 
example, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,72 Justice O’Connor’s opinion more 
directly indicated the importance of the magnitude of burden in the singling-
out takings inquiry.73  Justice O’Connor stated that, among other factors, 
                                                          
 69.  See id. at 147–49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 70.  Id. at 148–49 (emphasis added). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
 73.  Id. at 537. 
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“[when legislation] singles out certain employers to bear a burden that is sub-
stantial in amount . . . the governmental action implicates fundamental prin-
ciples of fairness underlying the Takings Clause.”74  Similarly, in Lingle v. 
Chevron,75 Justice O’Connor’s opinion stressed that a successful takings 
claim should demonstrate that a plaintiff “has been singled out to bear [a] 
particularly severe regulatory burden.”76  In both instances, the focus on 
“substantial” and “particularly severe” burdens indicates that it is magnitude, 
not mere inequality of results, that drives the inquiry. 
This magnitude concern fits well within the context of Fifth Amendment 
protections of property, but it does not necessarily depend on an entity being 
singled out for differential treatment, as a few additional hypothetical exam-
ples further illustrate.  For instance, under an inequality-of-results theory of 
eminent domain, no compensation would be owed if the government con-
demned the property in an entire town or large-enough neighborhood because 
no individual owner would be singled out.  Rather, all would share the burden 
evenly.  This result is obviously flawed.  In such an instance, every property 
owner should be owed compensation because the condemnation takes fee 
simple ownership of property, thereby imposing a great magnitude of burden 
on all property owners.  As a matter of diminution of property expectations, 
there is a taking of property, regardless of the fact that the burden is distrib-
uted among all neighbors. 
In the regulatory takings context, the same reasoning would apply.  If a 
regulation involved physical government occupation of all the property in a 
town, such occupation would be a per se regulatory taking under Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.77  The fact that no one property owner 
is singled out ought to have no bearing on the analysis.  There is a taking of 
all the owners’ rights to exclude, and regardless of how distributed that bur-
den is, the taking exists.  Similarly, if the government regulated in such a way 
to eliminate all economic value in an entire town, the provision would be a 
taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,78 despite the rela-
tively even distribution of the burden.79 
Conversely, a regulation causing a small diminution in property expec-
tations, such as banning the burning of trash in one’s yard, would not arise to 
a taking, even if it affected only a single parcel.  While such a regulatory 
burden would be concentrated and create an inequality of results, it is not a 
                                                          
 74.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 75.  544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 76.  Id. at 544 (emphasis added). 
 77.  458 U.S. 419 (1982); see id. at 441 (holding that a regulation requiring third-party physical 
invasion of property is a per se taking). 
 78.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 79.  See generally id. (holding that a regulation eliminating all economic value of a property is 
a taking). 
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sufficient reduction in property expectations to require compensation.  Simi-
larly, to adopt Justice Scalia’s examples from Lucas of instances where a 
taking is not present, 
[T]he owner of a lakebed . . . would not be entitled to compensa-
tion when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a land-
filling operation that would have the effect of flooding others’ land.  
Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is 
directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery 
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.80 
In both of these instances, an individual would be singled out to bear the 
cost of a public burden and would experience inequality of results.  The par-
ticular hypothetical lakebed owner is not allowed to fill the land, and the par-
ticular hypothetical nuclear plant owner must remove the plant.  Other 
lakebed owners may be able to fill land, and other nuclear plant owners may 
continue operation, but these unlucky two cannot because of their particular 
situations.  These hypothetical property owners acutely experience these re-
spective restrictions on property use, and these restrictions constrain the in-
dividuals to benefit the public at large.  However, Justice Scalia holds these 
hypotheticals out as quintessential examples of when a taking has not oc-
curred, explaining that in these instances, the background limits on property 
rights diminish the property owners’ expectations.81  Justice Scalia explains 
that in these contexts, the hypothetical property owners never had the right to 
undertake the discussed activities (filling the lakebed or operating the nuclear 
plant) because the activities threaten significant harm to neighbors or the pub-
lic at large, thereby constituting a nuisance.82  Since no property owner has a 
right to cause a nuisance, no property right is taken from these hypothetical 
property owners when restrictions limit nuisance-causing activity.83 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in these examples is premised on a magnitude 
of burdens test for determining whether a compensable taking occurs.  Justice 
Scalia first determines the scope of the hypothetical property owners’ legiti-
mate expectations and then measures how much the restrictions diminish 
those expectations.  He finds that the magnitude of the burden is low because 
restrictions on causing nuisance (thereby avoiding lakebed flooding or nu-
clear accident) do not appreciably diminish property expectations, which 
never included the right to cause a nuisance.  Under Justice Scalia’s exam-
                                                          
 80.  See id. at 1029–30 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1239–41 
(1967)). 
 81.  Cf. id. 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  Cf. id. 
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ples, even though the hypothetical property owners are singled out, the mag-
nitude of their burdens is simply not sufficient to create a compensable tak-
ing.84 
In sum, the core Fifth Amendment takings inquiry into the magnitude 
of burdens may have been termed an inquiry into singling out, but it does not 
precisely examine singling out nor necessarily depend on it.  Rather than con-
sidering inequality of results, its core focus is on the magnitude of burdens.  
The line of what constitutes an unacceptably high burden is not easy to de-
fine, and that is the central question that the takings inquiry grapples with in 
defining how far is “too far.”  However, precisely speaking, such an inquiry 
into the diminution of property rights is separate and independent from a sin-
gling-out question because it does not require that a property owner be treated 
differently than her neighbor.  Put another way, the takings analysis does not 
require a comparison of one property owner to another.85  The question of the 
magnitude of a property owner’s burden is not measured by the magnitude 
of a neighbor’s burden; rather it is measured against the property owner’s 
legitimate expectations.  Unlike a true singling-out analysis, which requires 
a comparison of one individual relative to another, the magnitude-of-burdens 
analysis requires only a comparison of an individual’s post-regulation situa-
tion to that same individual’s pre-regulation rights. 
4.  Distributive Social Justice 
Finally, one additional variation on the singling-out concern can arise 
from considering the distributive social justice implications of a law, such as 
any potential disproportionate impact that a regulation may have on certain 
groups like the impoverished or politically vulnerable.  For example, if a non-
arbitrary law results in all residents of a municipality having to pay $100 for 
a driver’s license, but if a few residents earn only $100 per month, then the 
regulation disproportionately impacts those residents, thereby singling them 
out based on their income level.  This reflects a singling-out concern that is 
distinct from those above. Here the law does not appear illegitimately arbi-
trary, nor does this present a pure inequality of results, because all residents 
are subject to the same burden.  Finally, the absolute amount of the burden is 
relatively low, so there is unlikely to be a concern with the magnitude of the 
burden.  However, because the distributive impact of the regulation dispro-
portionately singles out some individuals because of their lack of wealth, this 
raises a distributive justice concern86 that incorporates elements of political 
process failure, inequality of results, and magnitude of burdens.  The worry 
                                                          
 84.  Cf. id. 
 85.  For additional discussion see Pappas, supra note 42, at 41–46. 
 86.  See generally Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 743–
44 (1999) (characterizing the concept of distributive justice as at least attempting not to further 
disadvantage those already disadvantaged in terms of wealth and influence). 
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is that certain individuals or groups are singled out in a relative sense because 
the relative magnitude of their burdens is great.  As a result, though the fee is 
equally imposed, it is unequally felt, particularly burdening those unlikely to 
wield power in the political process.  So, though this form of singling out is 
distinct from those discussed above, it raises political process concerns com-
mon to the other inquiries. 
Takings jurisprudence provides some traces of support for this distribu-
tive social justice approach to singling out through the “parcel as a whole” 
concept.87  By considering the parcel as a whole, courts evaluating takings 
claims give some attention to the relative magnitude of burdens in light of 
the total amount of property impacted, making compensation somewhat more 
likely when a regulation impacts an owner of a small parcel rather than an 
owner of a large parcel.88  Additionally, the contributions of property and 
social justice scholars like Jeremy Waldron89 and Hanoch Dagan90 argue that 
property law in general, and takings jurisprudence in particular, should in-
corporate distributive social justice principles.  For example, Dagan has ar-
gued that, as a normative matter, property doctrines ought to consider limited 
redistributive compensation in light of egalitarian concerns.91  Dagan has sug-
gested that the “virtue of social responsibility and the ideal of avoiding any 
preferential treatment of the better-off” counsel exploring how “progressive 
distributive considerations [could] be grafted onto takings law” via a “pro-
gressive compensation scheme.”92  The upshot of this assertion is the aspira-
tional, normative proposal that takings law ought to consider when an indi-
vidual is singled out in a distributive social justice sense and ought to adjust 
compensation accordingly, thereby remedying both social injustice and lack 
of access to political process. 
B. Assessing the Different Types of Singling Out 
The various singling-out inquiries are effects-oriented in that they ex-
amine whether government action has a particular impact (that is, whether it 
imposes arbitrary discrimination, inequality of results, etc.).  Depending on 
these impacts, the inquiries then derive a conclusion about the legitimacy of 
government action.  However, not all of the singling-out inquiries provide 
the same level of insight into the legitimacy of laws.  Some ask the question 
                                                          
 87.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). 
 88.  See, e.g., Justin Pidot, Eroding the Parcel, 39 VT. L. REV. 647, 648 (2015) (discussing how 
the parcel as a whole rule “provid[es] a kind of rough justice when it comes to allocating burdens 
based on wealth”). 
 89.  See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, in 
LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981–1991, 370, 373–74, 376, 387 (1993). 
 90.  See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 86. 
 91.  See id. at 743–44, 752, 759. 
 92.  See id. at 741, 743–44, 753. 
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directly, whereas others look for clues that might indirectly indicate illegiti-
macy.  Thus, depending on the type of singling-out inquiry, the link between 
the singling-out action and the underlying legitimacy concern can be more or 
less attenuated.  This attenuation, in turn, impacts how well the singling-out 
inquiry serves the values it is designed to protect.  As a result, not all of these 
singling-out inquiries are equally relevant or compelling, as the hypotheticals 
in the previous Section help to demonstrate. 
This Section assesses how well the different singling-out inquiries 
match with their underlying legitimacy and process concerns, offering insight 
about prioritizing the different inquiries.  It argues that the arbitrary discrim-
ination inquiry is most responsive to these concerns whereas the inequality-
of-results inquiry is least relevant.  Moreover, it finds that the magnitude-of-
burden inquiry, though not necessarily predicated on singling out, overlaps 
with legitimacy concerns.  Finally, it concludes that the distributive-social-
justice inquiry requires further refining of normative commitments before it 
can be effectual. 
Of the singling-out inquiries, arbitrary discrimination most directly ad-
dresses political process and legitimacy.  It has a clear link to those concepts 
because it involves a simple, one-step analysis based on whether a non-arbi-
trary reason justifies differential treatment of an individual.  An arbitrary law 
is illegitimate, even if it does not single out an individual, because the power 
of government does not extend to arbitrary actions.93  Further, in the instance 
of arbitrary discrimination, the singling out itself offers dispositive proof of 
the arbitrariness, and consequent illegitimacy, of a government action.  Arbi-
trary discrimination is per se an illegitimate government act.94  Thus, the ar-
bitrary discrimination inquiry directly engages the question of the legitimacy 
at the core of the singling-out concern. 
Unlike arbitrary discrimination, the other types of singling out do not 
embody illegitimate government action themselves; rather they offer non-
dispositive evidence to suggest possible illegitimacy.  In a singling-out anal-
ysis, courts must examine the effects of rational government actions to see if 
these effects are so unacceptable as to betray some hidden defect.95  Essen-
                                                          
 93.  See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (“The touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government . . . .” (quoting Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974))). 
 94.  As a general matter, this is the case because individuals are protected against arbitrary 
government action, and such arbitrary action would contravene due process guarantees.  See id.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also expressly held that arbitrary discrimination violates equal 
protection guarantees.  See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
 95.  For example, justices have attempted to work backwards from unequal results to uncover 
majoritarian tyranny or factional abuses.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 148–49 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating a concern about “discrimination”); Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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tially, these types of singling-out inquiries identify proxies for hidden illegit-
imacy buried in non-arbitrary actions.  As a result, the key questions for as-
sessing these forms of singling out are: How well do they identify reliable 
proxies?  How much do these singling-out inquiries reveal about government 
legitimacy or functioning political process?  How apt are they for unmasking 
non-arbitrary justifications as pretense for illegitimate government actions?  
Do they highlight results that run so contrary to normative commitments that 
even a rational justification nonetheless demonstrates illegitimacy or failure 
of political process? 
Examined under this set of criteria, the magnitude-of-burden inquiry 
seems to hold up as a meaningful test for government legitimacy, despite the 
fact that it is not precisely a singling-out inquiry.  Protection of private prop-
erty can be viewed as a shield against majoritarian abuses96 (such as uncom-
pensated redistribution of property)97 or factional mischief98 (such as costless 
over-regulation by captured agencies).99  Either way, the underlying protec-
tion overlaps with the singling-out concern for government legitimacy and 
functional political process.  Moreover, the magnitude-of-burden test also 
taps into normative commitments to stability of property rights for both social 
peace100 and utilitarian economic efficiency.101  Thus, while the magnitude-
of-burden inquiry does not truly rest on singling out but rather on the dimi-
nution of property expectations,102 it also engages the legitimacy interests that 
underlie the singling-out concern. 
                                                          
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (G. Wills ed., 1982) (stating a concern 
with factional mischief)). 
 96.  See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1483 (1990) 
(“[P]roperty is often taken because of pure majoritarian pressure (or even the pressure of politically 
powerful minorities).”). 
 97.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 
1689 (1984) (discussing “the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than 
another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain 
what they want”). 
 98.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 46 (“But the most common and durable 
source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.  Those who hold and 
those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.”). 
 99.  See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 264–65 (1985) (discussing how agencies will respond to incentives by overreg-
ulating when regulation is too cheap and by falling subject to capture or influence by powerful 
factions). 
 100.  Cf. Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 116 (2015) (discussing the violence that results from ill-defined and infor-
mal property rights). 
 101.  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 587 (1984) (summarizing support for the conclusion that “[t]he theory that 
stable property expectations are necessary for productivity pervades legal doctrine”). 
 102.  This is consistent with the taking inquiry’s textual roots in the Fifth Amendment protection 
of property. 
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Conversely, the inequality-of-results inquiry finds no foundation in ei-
ther the legitimacy justifications animating the singling-out concern or in 
other strongly held normative commitments.  In fact, the inequality-of-results 
test runs contrary to the singling-out goal of ensuring legitimate government 
because it results in arbitrary government action to equalize results.  Moreo-
ver, it also runs contrary to normative commitments to utilitarian economic 
efficiency as well as distributive social justice. 
The legitimacy concerns underlying the singling-out inquiry focus on 
the importance of general and equal applicability of laws,103 but that principle 
contains no guarantee of equal result under the law.  After all, a completely 
legitimate, generally applicable, non-arbitrary law may occasion different re-
sults for different individuals based on their different situations.  For exam-
ple, if a municipality’s cost of providing sewer connections rises based on 
the number of bathrooms in a house, then the municipality is rationally justi-
fied in charging the owner of a two-bathroom house more than the owner of 
a one-bathroom house,104 even if there is some form of singling out because 
there is only one two-bathroom house in town.  The inequality of results is 
based on inequality of circumstances, and the rational, generally applicable 
law creates a differential impact because the individuals are not similarly sit-
uated.  This may seem obvious or implicit, but it is worth making express for 
clarification of the singling-out inquiries.  In evaluating the legitimacy of 
government action, the typical focus is on ex ante equality in terms of general 
applicability of laws as opposed to ex post equality based on similarity of 
results.105 
However, a singling-out inquiry focusing on inequality of results exam-
ines only ex post equality, and in doing so, it can actually undermine legiti-
macy by encouraging arbitrary treatment of individuals, such as equalizing 
results when a rational approach would call for differential treatment.  For 
example, if a municipality’s cost of providing sewer connections rises based 
on the number of bathrooms in a house, but the municipality nonetheless 
seeks to ensure equality of results and charges the owner of a two-bathroom 
                                                          
 103.  See generally Ely, supra note 18, at 350. 
 104.  See Dagan, supra note 86, at 761 (noting the importance of rational planning-based con-
siderations for government actions, especially when they involve imposing costs). 
 105.  The disparate impact doctrine is a notable exception.  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as ‘disparate 
treatment’) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have 
a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as ‘disparate impact’).”).  This disparate 
impact doctrine can be seen as incorporating elements of a social justice concern in looking for 
legitimacy not just ex ante but also ex post in regard to the effects on systematically disadvantaged 
populations. 
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house the same price as the owner of a one-bathroom house, that action ap-
pears arbitrary.106  Rather than rationally basing the price on the cost of ser-
vice, the municipality has decided that everyone should pay the same amount 
regardless of price, which requires either overcharging the less-expensive 
residents or cross-subsidizing the more expensive residents from another 
source. 
As a rejoinder, one might assert that the goal of equality of results, such 
as equal pricing for all sewer connections, is not arbitrary and that a govern-
ment may have valid and legitimate interests in pursuing equality of results 
for its own sake.  Acknowledging that opinions can differ over the normative 
appeal of blanket equality of results, there appear few—if any—convincing 
arguments for it in this context.  First, pure equality of results has little to do 
with the legitimacy and political process goals that underscore the singling-
out concern.  Policing process and legitimacy tends to call for an initial focus 
on ex ante general applicability of laws and an ex post inquiry into results for 
evidence of process malfunctions, such as self-serving or enemy-prejudicing 
factional mischief, particularly against the less powerful or politically disad-
vantaged.  However, a blanket equality-of-results approach does little to fer-
ret out self-serving mischief or selective disadvantage because it is too blunt 
an instrument.  It just looks at results, but it ignores their context.  Because 
inequality of results is just as likely to arise from a rational law produced by 
functioning political process as it is from some process malfunction, the in-
quiry offers no insight into legitimacy.  Thus, a pure inequality-of-results in-
quiry, that looks only to ensure equal result regardless of situation, is simply 
not attuned to select for political process problems or disadvantages against 
powerless groups. Quite to the contrary, it appears ripe for factional mischief, 
with powerful individuals (for example, two-bathroom homeowners) likely 
to insist on equality of results only in instances that benefit them.107 
As such, an inequality-of-results inquiry not only fails to detect political 
process defects, but also may undermine both singling-out concerns and con-
sistently held normative commitments, such as internalizing costs and avoid-
ing regressive burdens.  A commitment to pure equality of result serves as a 
wealth-transfer or subsidy.  By fixing one price in the name of equality, the 
municipality forces the less-costly individuals (here the one-bathroom home-
owners) to pay their full share, or possibly more, while subsidizing the more-
costly individuals (the two-bathroom homeowners) that pay less than their 
full share.  So, instead of two-bathroom houses internalizing their costs and 
                                                          
 106.  Though one might imagine some justification for the flat price, such as saving on admin-
istrative costs in processing payment amounts.  For purposes of simplicity, the hypothetical stipu-
lates arbitrariness. 
 107.  Cf. Davidson, supra note 23, at 37–42 (discussing how the most politically powerful are 
often able to receive the greatest judicial protection in the regulatory takings context). 
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paying the full price of their sewer connections (resulting in a rational ine-
quality of results), two-bathroom homeowners externalize the costs of their 
sewer connections and others (either the general taxpayers or the one-bath-
room homeowners) bear the increased sewer-connection cost.  In such a case, 
there is a wealth redistribution that can be criticized on both economic and 
social justice grounds.  As an economic matter, this subsidy distorts the mar-
ket for multi-bathroom houses and imposes externalized costs on individuals 
(either all taxpayers or one-bathroom homeowners) who gain no benefit and 
are not party to the transaction.  As a social justice matter, this not only cre-
ates opportunities for factional mischief but also likely creates a regressive 
system that imposes more costs on less powerful or less wealthy individuals 
(one-bathroom homeowners) who pay a greater share and a greater percent-
age of their income relative to the wealthier and more powerful (two-bath-
room homeowners).  For these reasons, a blanket equality of results approach 
has not been a consistent normative priority in United States law.  There is 
no fundamental right to general equality of results, and current institutions 
do not demonstrate a commitment to it.  Because this inequality-of-results 
inquiry works against legitimacy values as well as other normative commit-
ments, it is out of place in the singling-out concern (and should probably be 
avoided altogether). 
Conversely, a distributive-social-justice approach may represent a de-
fensible and even desirable tool for serving the singling-out concern.  How-
ever, the exact content of a distributive-social-justice inquiry is difficult to 
determine because normative commitments and priorities in this area can 
vary.  Like an inequality-of-results inquiry, a distributive-social-justice in-
quiry examines ex post results of a non-arbitrary government action.  How-
ever, instead of broadly searching only for context-blind inequality of results, 
a distributive-social-justice inquiry combs for particular results most likely 
to prejudice certain groups, such as the impoverished or politically disenfran-
chised.  By focusing on these groups, this inquiry can more directly grapple 
with the concerns about political process failures such as majoritarian or fac-
tional harm against the vulnerable, thereby informing a core focus of the sin-
gling-out concern.  Moreover, the distributive-social-justice inquiry, at least 
more so than the inequality-of-results inquiry, has some consistency with 
other normative commitments identifiable in United States law and policy, 
such as the progressive income tax or other needs-based allotments.108  How-
                                                          
 108.  See, e.g., Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 659 (2012) (“Differential taxation and targeted spending are the most signifi-
cant and most effective means by which government can ‘gradually and continually . . . correct the 
distribution of wealth and . . . prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of po-
litical liberty and fair equality of opportunity.’” (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 
(1971))). 
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ever, the major challenge to a distributive-social-justice inquiry is the inde-
terminate nature of social justice as a concept,109 as well as the difficulty of 
establishing exactly who should receive such singling-out protection.  To the 
extent that there can be agreement on the normative content of the social-
justice inquiry, the principle of distributive social justice is consistent with 
singling-out concerns, but achieving this agreement, particularly outside of 
the realm of fundamental rights, would require a degree of consistent norma-
tive commitments not currently evidenced by singling-out jurisprudence. 
III.  REASSESSING SINGLING OUT DOCTRINES 
In light of the four singling-out inquiries and their respective compati-
bility (or incompatibility) with underlying legitimacy and political process 
concerns, this Part reassesses the singling-out doctrines.  Section A addresses 
the more prevalent property-based approach and finds it is sorely lacking in 
terms of coherence and effectiveness.  Despite being the main announced 
protection against singling out, the property-based approach is poorly 
equipped to police singling out and, moreover, it interferes with administra-
tion of the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine.  First, the property-based ap-
proach cannot address arbitrariness.  Second, though it is effective in policing 
magnitude of burdens, the judicial language and administrative application 
of this approach have focused on inequality of results, working against legit-
imacy values and creating perverse incentives.  As a result, this approach is 
not only ill-suited to advance singling-out concerns but is also detrimental to 
property management, particularly in the case of specially situated properties.  
Section B then addresses the less-prevalent arbitrariness-based approach, 
which offers a logical inquiry into arbitrary discrimination that, despite in-
herent limitations and underdevelopment, is well tailored to the core singling-
out concerns. 
A.  Strengths and Weaknesses of a Property-Based Approach 
Though it is the more common and more touted doctrine for addressing 
singling-out concerns, the property-based approach, as deployed through the 
Fifth Amendment regulatory takings jurisprudence, underperforms.  The 
doctrine struggles to protect legitimacy and political process values because 
its imprecise language focuses attention on the wrong inquiries.  A central 
problem is that the property-based takings approach does not and cannot ad-
dress arbitrary discrimination, meaning that it cannot police an abuse at the 
heart of the singling-out concern.  Nonetheless, the property-based approach 
can provide some useful contribution by effectively policing magnitude of 
                                                          
 109.  See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, The Mirage of Social Justice, in LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 
(Routledge 1998) (criticizing the concept of social justice as empty and meaningless). 
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burdens, which, though not precisely a singling-out inquiry, is complemen-
tary to the legitimacy and process values of the singling-out concern.  Addi-
tionally, the property-based approach facilitates some small inquiry into dis-
tributive social justice, though it is minor at best.  However, the main failing 
of the property-based approach is in the imprecise language used in its im-
plementation, which implies that an inequality-of-results inquiry is a central 
focus of the takings test.  This actually undermines government legitimacy 
and political process by providing perverse incentives for agencies and land-
owners, particularly in regard to the management of specially situated prop-
erties.  As a result, the property-based approach creates problems both for 
singling-out protection and for application of the takings doctrine. 
1.  Arbitrary Discrimination 
The property-based approach does not and cannot address arbitrary dis-
crimination.  Thus, it cannot police the type of singling-out that most directly 
evidences illegitimacy and political process defects.  For all its singling-out 
language, the regulatory takings doctrine has no place for an arbitrariness 
inquiry.  The Court unanimously said as much in Lingle, which expressly 
aimed to delineate which considerations were and were not appropriate for 
takings claims.110  The Court held that the “substantially advances legitimate 
state interests” test, which ultimately was an inquiry into the arbitrariness of 
a law, was not the proper test for determining whether a regulation consti-
tuted a regulatory taking of property.111  Rather, the Court reasoned that the 
“substantially advances” formula was a due process inquiry, concluding that 
the rationality of government actions is not a takings question (or, does not 
call into question a need for compensation) but rather raises a separate ques-
tion about the validity of the law.  That is, an arbitrary law would presumably 
be invalid, and thus beyond the remedy of compensation, if it was so deficient 
in terms of advancing a legitimate state interest that it had no rational basis.112  
As a result, the arbitrariness inquiry is firmly outside of the scope of the tak-
ings doctrine. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to entertain an arbitrariness test as part 
of the takings jurisprudence, the remedy available from a takings claim would 
not be suited to addressing arbitrary government action because a takings 
claim can only provide compensation, not invalidation.  An arbitrary act is 
beyond the power of government, and it is thus an invalid act.  However, a 
regulatory taking arises from a valid act of government that happens to go 
too far in curtailing property rights.  The Fifth Amendment provides that a 
                                                          
 110.  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 540 U.S. 528, 532 (2005). 
 111.  Id. at 531–32. 
 112.  See id. at 540. 
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taking can be remedied by just compensation, but such compensation is suf-
ficient only in the case of an initially valid act.113  Compensation, however, 
cannot legitimate an invalid act or extend the government’s power to act ar-
bitrarily.  As such, a takings claim asks for the wrong remedy to address an 
arbitrary act. 
As a result, the property-based approach, as implemented through the 
takings inquiry, is not equipped to address arbitrary discrimination. 
2.  Magnitude of Burdens 
Though the property-based approach cannot directly address arbitrari-
ness, it is well suited to analyzing the magnitude of individual burdens.  As 
the Court has observed, the takings test “focuses directly upon the severity of 
the burden that government imposes upon private property rights.”114  In fact, 
this should be the central function of the takings test, as particularly embod-
ied by the first two Penn Central factors, which consider 1) the economic 
diminution and 2) the interference with investment-backed expectation 
caused by a government action.115  Both of these factors engage the magni-
tude of a burden by comparing the extent of a property owner’s pre-regulation 
property interest with her post-regulation interest.  Based on the difference 
between pre- and post-regulation property interests, courts determine 
whether a government action goes “too far”116 and occasions a compensable 
taking.117  As discussed above, this property-based magnitude-of-burdens in-
quiry shares a common goal with the singling-out concern by policing fac-
tional or majoritarian abuses, but the magnitude-of-burdens inquiry is not 
necessarily premised on a singling out.  Rather, it polices diminution of prop-
erty rights, regardless of whether the diminution impacts few or many. 
3.  Distributive Social Justice 
The property-based approach to singling out may also make some small 
contribution to distributive-social-justice concerns, though the impact is mi-
nor and does not appear to be an express focus of courts.  For example, the 
                                                          
 113.  See id. at 543 (“Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private property, 
the ‘substantially advances’ inquiry probes the regulation’s underlying validity.  But such an inquiry 
is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the 
Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”); 
Echeverria, supra note 34, at 201–02. 
 114.  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added). 
 115.  See id. at 540 (“[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon 
the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legiti-
mate property interests.”). 
 116.  See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 117.  Cf. Echeverria, supra note 34, at 209 (noting that the economic impact factor is the most 
important and determinative in the Penn Central test). 
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parcel as a whole concept takes some account of burdens relative to a prop-
erty owner’s total amount of property.  As a result, the magnitude of the bur-
den is determined in relation to the particular property rather than in absolute 
terms, which may result in marginally more takings protection to smaller 
landholders rather than larger ones.  However, this provides very limited (and 
potentially diminishing118) protection for distributive social justice, falling far 
from the redistributive approach advocated by Dagan.119  This limited pro-
tection is unsurprising since distributive-social-justice concerns have not 
been truly embraced by courts in the property context, and absent a change 
in normative commitment to such values, a property-based inquiry will likely 
offer little protection for distributive social justice.  Moreover, whatever lim-
ited distributive social justice is advanced by the property-based approach 
may also be offset by the regressive inequality-of-results inquiries discussed 
in the next Subsection. 
4.  Inequality of Results 
The great irony and perversity of the property-based approach is that the 
oft-repeated singling-out inquiry in the takings jurisprudence truly represents 
an inequality-of-results test.  As a result, the most robustly articulated sin-
gling-out protection actually impedes political process and government legit-
imacy as well as rational government action and planning-based property-
management. 
The singling-out language in the takings cases calls for an inequality-
of-results inquiry, evidenced by both the Court’s articulation and process of 
elimination.  By questioning “how any regulatory burden is distributed 
among property owners”120 and “[whether] individuals are singled out to bear 
the cost of advancing the public convenience,”121 the Court explicitly phrases 
its takings test in terms of inequality of results.122  The language cannot indi-
cate an arbitrary discrimination test, since that inquiry is outside the scope of 
the takings doctrine.  Moreover, since the magnitude-of-burdens inquiry does 
not actually require singling out, the singling-out language cannot accurately 
describe that inquiry either.  The Court’s takings jurisprudence has even dis-
tinguished the distributional singling-out test as separate from the magnitude-
                                                          
 118.  See Pidot, supra note 88, at 671 (noting that recent decisions have “dealt serious blows to 
the parcel-as-a-whole rule and the fairness sensibility contained within it”). 
 119.  See Dagan, supra note 86, at 741, 743–44, 752, 759. 
 120.  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (emphasis omitted). 
 121.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 148 n.11 (1978) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
 122.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
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of-burden test.123  Finally, given the minimal commitment to distributive so-
cial justice in the takings jurisprudence, the singling-out language in the tak-
ings context is left only to indicate an inequality-of-results inquiry. 
Cast as an inequality-of-results test, the singling-out takings language 
spurs the undesirable consequences discussed above,124 including irrational 
government action, factional mischief, and regressive wealth transfers.  As 
noted, a blanket guarantee of ex post equality-of-result is likely to create ar-
bitrary redistribution, transferring wealth without regard to need or other 
shared normative values as well as creating opportunity for regressive bur-
dens and factional hijacking.125  This is particularly likely and worrisome in 
the takings context, where propertied factions, which tend to be more politi-
cally powerful, can position themselves to take maximum advantage of sin-
gling-out protections despite needing the fewest political process protec-
tions.126  To revisit an earlier hypothetical, even if it is rational to charge a 
multi-bathroom homeowner a greater amount for a sewer connection, that 
homeowner may nonetheless be considered singled out under an inequality-
of-results inquiry.  If this multi-bathroom homeowner can receive compen-
sation through a takings claim, then there is a wealth redistribution from the 
general taxpayers (including single-bathroom homeowners) to the multi-
bathroom homeowner, who likely is wealthier and more powerful.  Obvi-
ously, this example offers a stylized generalization, but the underlying con-
cern has been documented in the takings context. For example, Nestor Da-
vidson has described this as the “inverted political economy of regulatory 
takings claims: the greatest judicial protection is provided to those most able 
to protect themselves through the political system.”127  Moreover, Davidson 
notes that while “[n]o rigorous study of the regulatory takings claimants has 
been undertaken, . . . what analysis has been done tends to underscore the 
comparative advantages of typical plaintiffs in such cases.”128 
Further, not even all property holders benefit from the singling-out tak-
ings analysis; the benefits inure particularly to those property owners more 
likely to experience inequality-of-result.  Thus, owners of more standard 
properties, such as run-of-the-mill urban homeowners or owners of small 
lots, will likely never have access to the property-based singling-out protec-
tion because the effects of regulation will be less likely to single out their 
properties because they are similarly situated and likely to be similarly im-
pacted.  Rather, it is owners of large tracts or landowners in less densely pop-
ulated areas that are more likely to experience inequality of results because 
                                                          
 123.  See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 124.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2 and II.B. 
 125.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2 and II.B. 
 126.  Cf. Davidson, supra note 23, at 37–42. 
 127.  Id. at 37–38. 
 128.  Id. at 42. 
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these properties are likely to be less like their neighbors’ and thus experience 
more differential impacts.  Consequently, the singling-out takings inquiry 
systematically advantages certain types of property owners such as develop-
ers of previously agricultural or wild land, rural property owners, extractive 
interests, and owners of coastal property.129  Thus, the benefits of the sin-
gling-out inquiry are highly concentrated, and this results in an arbitrary boon 
to a faction of (often wealthier) landowners, frustrating the legitimacy and 
political process values at the core of the singling-out concern. 
This arbitrary redistribution not only offends legitimacy and process 
concerns, but its regressive redistribution also contravenes other normative 
values, such as social justice concerns (as contestable as they may be).  For 
example, to the extent that any ex post wealth redistribution is justified, it is 
usually based on “the egalitarian ideal of giving preferential treatment to im-
provement in the lives of the worse-off, or, at least, of avoiding any structural 
privileges that favor the better-off.”130  However, the inequality-of-results 
takings inquiry accomplishes exactly the opposite by overprotecting certain 
better-offs and thereby contravening the consistently proffered justification 
for wealth redistribution. 
Given all of these problems stemming from the singling-out language in 
the takings jurisprudence, it is some consolation that courts seem to vastly 
overstate its influence. In fact, the impact of such language appears minimal 
in the courts.  A comprehensive survey of takings cases in the Supreme Court, 
lower federal courts, and state courts indicates that despite courts’ announced 
allegiance to a singling-out measure of takings, few, if any, takings cases 
actually turn on these grounds.131  However, even if not widely influential in 
case outcomes, courts’ singling-out takings language shapes behavior, par-
ticularly among potential litigants. 
For example, even if courts vastly overstate the extent that they apply a 
singling-out inquiry in takings cases, the singling-out language nonetheless 
has practical impacts.  As discussed further below, this is particularly the case 
for regulatory agencies and property-owners, who take the language at face 
value and perceive the takings test to incorporate an inequality-of-results in-
                                                          
 129.  Cf. Dagan, supra note 86, at 751. 
 130.  Id. at 778–79. 
 131.  While it is exceedingly difficult to prove the negative proposition that courts announce the 
singling-out inquiry and Armstrong principle, together, as a stand-alone takings test but then do not 
actually use that test to influence case results, a review of all citations to the Armstrong principle in 
the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts indicates that the Armstrong principle is 
oft-cited but never employed as the ultimate grounds for resolving a case.  See Pappas, supra note 
42, at 42–44; Davidson, supra note 23, at 44 (“Although equality norms have been recurring back-
ground tropes in the doctrine, the Court has never treated the Armstrong principle, questions of the 
generality of a regulation, or average reciprocity of advantage as dispositive or even as a sufficiently 
significant focus of analysis to yield discernable principles.”). 
PappasFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  10:22 AM 
152 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:122 
quiry.  As a result, agencies follow an illusory and undesirable takings ap-
proach that is inconsistent with both the core singling-out concerns for legit-
imacy and political process, and the results courts actually reach in takings 
cases.  Moreover, agency reliance on the perceived inequality-of-results in-
quiry has an enormous impact because federal and state regulatory agencies 
are on the front lines of land use and regulatory decisions, addressing many 
more of these issues than just those which reach courts through lawsuits. 
In addition to guiding regulators, the singling-out takings language also 
influences landowners who respond to the courts’ language as well as to reg-
ulatory guidance incorporating the inequality-of-results inquiry.  Accord-
ingly, the singling-out language also drives private behavior.  Thus, the same 
problems of arbitrary agency action and factional mischief associated with 
the inequality-of-results inquiry trickle down and multiply through federal 
and state agency implementation, leading not only to process failures but also 
normatively undesirable land-use incentives and regulatory management.  
This is especially true for specially situated properties likely to experience 
inequality of results, such as those with rare environments and species, his-
toric buildings, or unique cultural resources.  All said, the singling-out tak-
ings language is bad for singling-out concerns and bad for administration of 
the takings doctrine. 
For instance, takings jurisprudence can have a profound impact on reg-
ulatory agencies, and the perceived inequality-of-results inquiry incentivizes 
regulators to make land-use decisions on grounds other than non-arbitrary, 
planning-based132 considerations.  Instead it drives them to take arbitrary 
measures that avoid the natural inequality resulting from rational, generally 
applicable regulations.  A number of commentators have explored how tak-
ings protections influence regulatory behavior,133 positing that, on the one 
hand, a lack of takings protection will invite overregulation by making regu-
lation too cheap.134  On the other hand, an overly expansive view of takings 
protection will create excessive barriers to regulation and cause other per-
verse incentives.135  The singling-out takings language falls into the latter 
                                                          
 132.  Planning-based decisions can be seen as the opposite of arbitrary decisions.  Cf. Dagan, 
supra note 86, at 743 & n.8 (conceiving of “planning considerations as the aggregated preferences 
of the members of the pertinent community” and suggesting that planning-based concerns “are, or, 
at least, should be, dominant in land use law”). 
 133.  See, e.g., id. at 756 (positing that “inducing public officials to base their decisions solely 
on planning considerations” is one of the major efficiency-based concerns underpinning the takings 
doctrine). 
 134.  See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Tak-
ings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999); see also DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, 
PROPERTY: TAKINGS 41–42 (2002). 
 135.  See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1368 
(1991). 
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category, inflating agencies’ perceived takings liability and magnifying bu-
reaucratic risk aversion.  This pushes decisionmaking away from a non-arbi-
trary, planning-based approach and chills otherwise rational, non-compensa-
ble regulatory efforts.  Moreover, it particularly prejudices desirable 
regulation of specially situated properties,136 which are more likely to be con-
sidered singled-out through an inequality-of-results inquiry. 
In assessing the takings risks of their actions, federal and state agencies 
have assimilated the singling-out takings language into administrative re-
quirements and agency guidance, thereby entrenching an inequality-of-re-
sults approach as a barrier to planning-based decisionmaking.  Most promi-
nently, federal agencies have incorporated the singling-out inquiry into the 
mandatory Taking Implications Assessment (“TIA”)137 required by Execu-
tive Order 12630 (“the Order”).138  Aimed at “reduc[ing] the risk of undue or 
inadvertent burdens on the public fisc . . . ,” the Order requires agencies to 
“review their actions carefully to prevent unnecessary takings” and to “[e]sti-
mate, to the extent possible, the potential cost to the government in the event 
that a court later determines that the action constituted a taking.”139  Moreo-
ver, the Attorney General’s Guidelines for implementing the Order (“the 
Guidelines”)140 echo this concern with takings costs, specifically requiring 
“an estimation of potential financial exposure.”141 
The Order and the Guidelines take an expansive view of potential tak-
ings liability142 that extends even further because of the singling-out takings 
                                                          
 136.  There are many arguments for regulating specially situated properties. To survey a few that 
focus on protecting rare environments, habitats, and species, see generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND 
COUNTY ALMANAC vii–ix (1968); RASBAND, SALZMAN, & SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND POLICY 330–32 (2d. 2009); SALZMAN & THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 269–70 (3d ed., 2010); Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of 
Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 269–82 (1991). 
 137.  See Attorney General’s Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unantici-
pated Takings (unpublished) (issued June 30, 1988) [hereinafter Attorney Gen. Guidelines] (requir-
ing “a Takings Implication Assessment (TIA) before undertaking any proposed action or imple-
menting any policy . . . and . . . the identification and discussion of significant takings 
implications . . . in notices of proposed rulemaking”). 
 138.  Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. § 554 (1989) (“Governmental officials should be sensi-
tive to, anticipate, and account for, the obligations imposed by the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment in planning and carrying out governmental actions so that they do not result in 
the imposition of unanticipated or undue additional burdens on the public fisc.”). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  The Order requires the Attorney General to promulgate Guidelines for the Evaluation of 
Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings.  Id. 
 141.  See Attorney Gen. Guidelines, supra note 137. 
 142.  See Lynda L. Butler, The Politics of Takings: Choosing the Appropriate Decisionmaker, 
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749, 795 (1997) (criticizing the Guidelines for directing agencies to “take 
an expansive view of regulatory takings, interpreting some Supreme Court cases more broadly than 
may be necessary . . . [and] therefore err[ing] on the side of property rights in defining regulatory 
takings”); James P. Downey, Environmental Cleanup Actions, the Valuation of Contaminated Prop-
erties, and Just Compensation for Affected Property Owners, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 325, 339 
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language.  For example, they require TIAs to include inequality-of-results 
inquiries such as whether regulatory burdens fall “disproportionate[ly]” on 
certain property owners143 or whether regulations “forc[e] some people alone 
to bear public burdens.”144  On top of this, the Guidelines use the singling-
out principle to further expand the scope of possible takings liability, direct-
ing agencies to, when government action does not clearly fall under takings 
precedents such as Penn Central, Loretto, or Lucas,  “analyze the justice and 
fairness, in the context of Armstrong, . . . of the burden placed on the property 
owner.”145  Thus, by relying on the Armstrong inequality-of-results in-
quiry,146 the Guidelines extend the scope of potential takings liability to in-
clude instances that would otherwise fall outside the ambit of core takings 
cases.  In broadening the sweep of takings impact analyses, the Guidelines 
lead agencies to overestimate potential takings liability due to singling-out 
concerns, thus overprotecting against takings liability and chilling regulation 
of specially situated properties in particular. 
While the internal nature of the TIAs makes it difficult to definitively 
assess their impacts,147 commentators have observed that they have influ-
enced regulatory behavior toward greater wariness of potential takings.148  
For example, an analysis of agency action under the Endangered Species Act 
                                                          
(1993) (“The burdens imposed on agencies by this Order have been criticized as being dispropor-
tionate to the takings threat presented by environmental health and safety regulations.” (citing 
Kirsten Engel, Taking Risks: Executive Order 12,630 and Environmental Health and Safety Regu-
lations, 14 VT. L. REV. 213, 214 (1989))). 
 143.  Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. § 554 (1989) (“(b) When a proposed action would place 
a restriction on a use of private property, the restriction imposed on the use shall not be dispropor-
tionate to the extent to which the use contributes to the overall problem that the restriction is im-
posed to redress.”); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, Excerpt from Guidance on “Takings” from 
the Department of Justice, https://www.fws.gov/policy/library/rgtakingsguidance.pdf (“Regulation 
of an individual’s property must not be disproportionate, within the limits of existing information 
or technology, to the degree to which the individual’s property use is contributing to the overall 
problem.”) (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 144.  Attorney Gen. Guidelines, supra note 137. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See discussion supra Part II.A.4. and II.B. 
 147.  Butler, supra note 142, at 792–93; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
04-120T, AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER ON GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AFFECTING 
PRIVATE PROPERTY USE 8 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110436.pdf (“[A]gency officials 
said that they fully consider the potential takings implications of their regulatory actions, but . . . 
[the agency officials stated] that such assessments were not always documented in writing or re-
tained on file.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-1015, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AFFECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY USE 5, 7, 13, 16–
18 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031015.pdf. 
 148.  Butler, supra note 142, at 782, 792–93, 795–96 (1997); cf. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., 
National Policy Issuance No. 96-06: The Administration’s 10-Point Plan for the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (Mar. 6, 1995), http://www.fws.gov/policy/npi96_06.html (listing the following three prin-
ciples related to private property rights and takings concerns: “2. Minimize social and economic 
impacts[;] 3. Provide quick, responsive answers and certainty to landowners[;] 4. Treat landowners 
fairly and with consideration”). 
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suggests that “[t]he Supreme Court’s takings cases do shape the contours of 
habitat conservation at the margin.”149  Further, given that the Guidelines 
“make clear that the TIA requires selection of the alternative that poses the 
‘least risk’ to private property”150 and that the Order “provides the basis for 
restricting or even preventing . . . agencies from implementing actions hav-
ing takings implications,”151 there is an indication of the Order’s practical 
chilling effects on regulation.  While the Order would likely have this effect 
regardless of the singling-out language, the fact that the Order embraces the 
inequality-of-results inquiry institutionalizes this approach and adopts, as a 
matter of agency policy, some measure of sacrificing planning considerations 
in favor of blanket equality of results. 
The federal regulatory requirements are not alone in this regard, as state-
level guidance has also taken the courts’ singling-out takings language to 
heart and adopted the inequality-of-results approach.  Attorney general guid-
ance from Idaho,152 Montana,153 and Washington154 all repeat an inequality-
                                                          
 149.  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incen-
tives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 338 (1997).  But see id. at 336 (“A review of a crosssection of TIAs 
prepared by the FWS in connection with the designation of critical habitat suggests that the FWS 
does not believe current takings law significantly constrains their actions under the ESA.”). 
 150.  Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean 
Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 695, 759 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 151.  Butler, supra note 142, at 784 (emphasis added). 
 152.  See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., IDAHO REGULATORY TAKINGS ACT GUIDELINES, 
Appendix B-1 (2012), http://www.ag.idaho.gov/publications/legalManuals/RegulatoryTakings.pdf 
(providing a “Request For Takings Analysis” form that includes the question “Are You the Only 
Affected Property Owner” as an important piece of information). 
 153.  See MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES 2 (2011) 
https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/agguidelines.pdf (incorporating the Armstrong sin-
gling out inquiry in stating, “[t]he Takings Clauses are intended to bar the government from forcing 
some people (whose property is taken) to bear burdens that, in fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole (whose taxes would be used to pay just compensation)”); see also Kelly A. 
Casillas, ’Takings Primer—An Overview of Takings Law, ’http://mtplanners.org/me-
dia/2011%20Conference/Presentations/TakingsPrimer%20%5BCompatibility%20Mode%5D.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (describing the Penn Central analysis in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 
582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009), as “favor[ing] the claimants because the ordinance singled out rela-
tively few mobile home park owners to bear the public burden of providing affordable housing”). 
 154.  See WASH. ATTORNEY GEN., ADVISORY MEMORANDUM: AVOIDING UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 15 (2006), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploaded-
files/Home/About_the_Office/Takings/2006%20AGO%20Takings%20Guidance(1).pdf (“Be-
cause government actions often are characterized in terms of overall fairness, a taking or violation 
of substantive due process is more likely to be found when it appears that a single property owner 
is being forced to bear the burden of addressing some societal concern when in all fairness the cost 
ought to be shared across society.”). 
PappasFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  10:22 AM 
156 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:122 
of-results approach to takings, and the California Governor’s Office of Plan-
ning and Research155 as well as the American Planning Association156 have 
advanced similar interpretations of singling-out takings inquiries.  In each 
instance, federal and state regulators have adopted this inequality-of-results 
takings measure despite courts rarely—if ever—actually applying it.157  
Moreover, to avoid creating inequality of results, regulators are incentivized 
away from their otherwise rational planning-based actions in contravention 
of the underlying singling-out concerns of government legitimacy through 
rational action. 
This adoption of the inequality-of-results takings inquiry impacts regu-
latory behavior not only through official TIAs and guidance but also by trig-
gering risk aversion in individual agency bureaucrats.  While regulators may 
not directly pay the price of additional regulatory costs that arise from per-
ceived takings liability,158 a public choice analysis illustrates how individual 
incentives will nonetheless deter agencies from undertaking non-arbitrary, 
planning-based regulations that could create an inequality of results and lead 
to a takings challenge.  Public choice scholars have observed that government 
agencies and agency bureaucrats tend to be “risk averse”159 and “defensive, 
threat-avoiding, [and] scandal-minimizing.”160  As a result, agency personnel 
resist actions that might invite criticism, harm the agency’s public reputation, 
alienate important constituencies, or heighten scrutiny from the public or 
Congress.161  So, even though a risk-neutral, planning-based approach to reg-
ulation would be preferable from a social welfare perspective,162 both public 
                                                          
 155.  See CAL. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF CAL. GEN. PLAN 
GUIDELINES 232 (2003), http://opr.ca.gov/docs/General_Plan_Guidelines_2003.pdf (noting “the 
Supreme Court’s concern over regulations that attempt to place an unfair burden on a single property 
owner”). 
 156.  See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, Policy Guide on Takings (Apr. 11, 1995), https://plan-
ning.org/policy/guides/adopted/takings.htm (characterizing the takings cases as mandating that reg-
ulations “apportion fairly the burdens and benefits of land development”). 
 157.  See Pappas, supra note 42, at 42–44. 
 158.  Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 346–48 (2000) (arguing that regulators do not respond 
to market forces in the same way that private actors would). 
 159.  James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 376 
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). 
 160.  Id. at 378; MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAw 358 (2009) (“Economists have predicted that the incentive structure faced 
by bureaucrats will lead to unduly risk-averse decision-making.”). 
 161.  STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 160, at 346–48. 
 162.  Id. at 359 (“Strict cost-benefit analysis suggests that social welfare is maximized when 
regulators act in a risk-neutral manner.”); see also Dagan, supra note 86, at 756 (discussing plan-
ning-based decision-making). 
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choice theory and empirical studies163 indicate that agencies are systemati-
cally biased toward making decisions that invite less public criticism.164  For 
example, agencies may avoid actions that result in easily traceable or identi-
fiable impacts,165 or regulators may choose whether or not to regulate in cer-
tain areas based on considerations such as media attention.166 
The risk of takings litigation and its attendant publicity are particularly 
likely to trigger agency risk aversion responses, and the singling-out takings 
inquiry maps onto agency risk aversion to create a situation where agencies 
are particularly unlikely to regulate based on planning considerations.  First, 
regulation of specially situated properties often draws the attention of im-
portant constituencies and Congress.  For example, there is empirical evi-
dence that influential constituencies, such as groups of large property owners, 
have influenced regulation under the Endangered Species Act.167  Relatedly, 
regulations of property under the Endangered Species Act are a lightning rod 
for congressional scrutiny and heated rhetoric, even prompting Senators to 
publicly castigating agency actions as “[an] assault on private property rights 
through abusive tactics.”168  Takings issues are also likely to draw media at-
tention since “the occasions on which it is judicially enforced tend to be dra-
matic and highly visible.”169 
All of these combine to play on regulators’ risk aversion, making them 
less likely to impose regulation that could possibly invite takings claims.  In 
the case of land use, this can lead to systematic under-regulation, which is 
more anonymous than regulation and thus less traceable to particular agency 
action and less likely to generate agency publicity.  Moreover, with singling-
out language increasing the likelihood of takings claims regarding specially 
situated property, the risk aversion and under-regulation is exacerbated.  The 
ultimate result is that agencies base decisions on the preference of groups of 
large property owners or avoidance of media attention, and this is exactly 
                                                          
 163.  See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 160, at 359. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See id. at 361 (citing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 19–29 (1993)). 
 167.   See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for 
Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1153 (1999); Thompson, supra note 149, at 320–21. 
 168.  See, e.g., David Vitter, Opinion, Abuse of Endangered Species Act Threatens American’s 
Private Property Rights, FOX NEWS (Dec. 28, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/opin-
ion/2013/12/28/abuse-endangered-species-act-threatens-american-private-property-rights/ (criti-
cizing agency “assault on private property rights through abusive tactics under the [Endangered 
Species Act]”); see also GOP to Propose Changing Endangered Species Act, CBS NEWS (Feb. 4, 
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gop-to-propose-changing-endangered-species-act/; Julian 
Hattem, GOP Gangs Up On Endangered Species Law, THE HILL (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/192965-gop-gangs-up-on-endangered-species-
law. 
 169.  Dagan, supra note 86, at 791. 
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contrary to the underlying singling-out concern for legitimate government 
and avoidance of the mischief of factions.  Thus, the singling-out takings in-
quiry becomes wholly untethered from its roots and defeating of its own en-
terprise. 
Consistent with this public choice theory, there is evidence of agency 
action to avoid regulation that might spur singling-out takings claims.  For 
instance, an agency may choose to buyout certain property rights rather than 
regulate them and risk takings litigation.  One example is the Bureau of Rec-
lamation’s (“BoR”) recent approach to augmenting flows in the Snake River 
for the benefit of endangered salmon and steelhead, as required by a 2008 
Biological Opinion under the Endangered Species Act.170  As part of the strat-
egy for augmenting flows, BoR purchased water storage contract entitle-
ments from a landowner.171  As an alternative to purchasing the water, BoR 
could have instead imposed a regulation, such as restricting water withdraw-
als, limiting water contract deliveries, or cancelling water delivery contracts.  
All of these regulatory approaches have been used in other instances where 
additional water was needed to protect endangered species, and all have been 
found valid and non-compensable.172  The decision to buyout the water in-
stead of relying on such tried regulation may have been motivated by fear of 
a takings claim and its attendant publicity.173 
Of course, some would argue that this buyout represents a triumph of 
agency decisionmaking rather than a defect.  Under such a view, the prefer-
able policy for protecting specially situated properties would be for govern-
ment actors to buy them out, and prospective buyouts may indeed be the pref-
erable course in some instances.  But to the extent that such a decision is 
motivated by fear of takings claims arising from inequality-of-results inquir-
ies, then regulatory choices appear unnecessarily and arbitrarily constrained.  
Court decisions do not support property expectations so robust that buyouts 
are required for every inequality of results, and, as the well-worn saying goes, 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
                                                          
 170. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 171.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINDING OF NO 
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PURCHASE OF CONTRACT 
ENTITLEMENT IN DEADWOOD RESERVOIR FOR SALMON FLOW AUGMENTATION (2011), 
http://www.usbr.gov/pn/programs/ea/idaho/dwwater/dwpurchFONSI.pdf. 
 172.  See, e.g., David N. Cassuto & Steven Matthew Reed, Water Law and the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (July 28, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650241 (summariz-
ing Endangered Species Act cases allowing for cancellation of water contract rights and finding no 
takings liability). 
 173.  Another example is the case of buyout programs for properties that are vulnerable to coastal 
and riverine flooding.  See, e.g., ANNE SIDERS, COLUMBIA CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 
MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM 
VULNERABLE AREAS 109–26 (2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/micro-
sites/climate-change/files/Publications/Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf. 
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general law.”174  Thus, regulators must retain the ability to make a choice, 
based on the context and immediate situation, about whether to regulate or 
compensate to protect specially situated properties.  The singling-out takings 
language erodes that aspect of choice, pushing agency actors toward buyouts 
or inaction.  Moreover, suggesting to property owners and regulators that 
buyouts are the only option will drive the price of these buyouts up, both by 
inflating property expectations about value of development rights and by tak-
ing away bargaining power from the regulators.  This systematically leads to 
higher prices for these buyouts and to regulators either overpaying or not 
protecting specially situated property at all.  Even those in favor of minimal 
regulation and strong property rights should have no reason to support gov-
ernment overpaying and granting arbitrary windfalls to owners of specially 
situated property.  Moreover, even if these windfalls and their draw on the 
public fisc were limited by the relative rarity of specially situated properties, 
other societal concerns can be marshalled to argue against buyouts as a sole 
approach.  For example, an expectation of compensation for all unequal bur-
dens “underplays the significance of belonging to a community . . . [and] 
commodifies both our citizenship and our membership in local communi-
ties.”175 
In addition to the impacts on regulators, the singling-out takings inquiry 
also influences the behavior of property owners,176 and by giving the impres-
sion that property owners are protected from inequality-of-results singling 
out, it leads to overinvestment in specially situated properties as well as 
skewed expectations about regulation of those properties.  Scholars have 
noted the incentive effects of takings protections, observing that perception 
of insufficiently robust takings protections can lead to underinvestment by 
landowners,177 and overly robust takings protection will lead to overinvest-
ment by landowners.178  As with the chilling of regulation, current singling-
out language may amplify overinvestment, particularly in the case of owners 
of specially situated properties.  Properties, such as those with rare environ-
mental habitats or species, wetlands, important historic resources, or unique 
cultural elements, are notable and particularly regulated because they are un-
common.  By the same token, precisely because they are uncommon and par-
ticularly regulated, such properties are also more likely to be singled out by 
regulation creating inequality of results.  Takings jurisprudence gives the im-
pression that such properties will receive heightened scrutiny and protection 
                                                          
 174.  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 175.  Dagan, supra note 86, at 771–72. 
 176.  See, e.g., id. at 774, 791. 
 177.  See, e.g., id. at 749–50; Butler, supra note 142, at 765 & n.73 (discussing relevant schol-
arship). 
 178.  See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 86, at 749; Levmore, supra note 135, at 1346 n.18; Christopher 
Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 
387 (2014). 
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against regulation, but this leads to perverse incentives and unrealistic expec-
tations for owners of specially situated property.  The singling-out language 
encourages property owners to expect less regulation and to develop more 
intensively on the very land that is most likely to be regulated and may have 
more limits on intense development. 
Moreover, the singling-out takings language distorts how property own-
ers might otherwise use their land.  As market actors, property owners can be 
guided by market signals in decisions about the use or sale of land.  Singling-
out language in takings cases sends a market signal that property rights are 
more expansive than they actually are, particularly in the case of specially 
situated property, leading to overinvestment based on artificially high valua-
tions of the development potential of such properties.179  Such pricing signals 
can also stand in the way of would-be voluntary measures to protect specially 
situated property.  For example, if a landowner erroneously believes she has 
unlimited development potential free of regulation on her specially situated 
property, she may be less likely to enter into conservation easements or other 
conservationist market transactions because of her artificially inflated view 
of the prospective development value.  The same distortion impedes volun-
tary market measures by owners of historic buildings or other culturally im-
portant properties.  Finally, the singling-out language influences not only 
those who already own specially situated land but also decisions to buy such 
land for development, leading to future disputes and litigation regarding land 
uses.  Thus, singling-out takings language effectively subsidizes private ac-
quisition and alteration of specially situated properties despite countervailing 
policies aimed at preservation or public access to these resources. 
As a result, the singling-out language in the takings inquiry also raises 
the price of regulating such properties by encouraging takings claims that 
might not be filed absent such language.  The owners of specially situated 
properties may seize upon the singling-out test and argue that because they 
suffer inequality of results from a generally applicable law, they have been 
singled out to bear a public burden.180  Litigating this marginal increase in 
claims imposes costs by requiring the additional expenditure of resources, 
and even though such cases are unlikely to succeed, “so long as any prospect 
of liability remains, the mere risk of litigation can have an outsize impact on 
governmental decisionmaking,”181 frustrating the agency incentives dis-
cussed above. 
                                                          
 179.  Christopher Serkin has noted a similar moral hazard risk of overinvestment in vulnerable 
property if the government acts as a de facto “insurer of last resort” through passive takings liability.  
See Serkin, supra note 178. 
 180.  Cf. Thompson, supra note 44, at 1301 (proposing a hypothetical singling-out takings chal-
lenge to the Endangered Species Act); see also Thompson, supra note 167. 
 181.  Serkin, supra note 178, at 398; see also Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Gov-
ernments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1671–74 (2006) 
(discussing how takings liability can lead to government risk aversion). 
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*    *    * 
In sum, the main positive contribution of the property-based approach 
to policing singling out comes from its ability to address magnitude of bur-
dens, which is not truly a singling-out concern but does advance legitimacy 
and political process values.  Beyond the magnitude-of-burdens inquiry, 
though, the property-based approach does little to address singling-out con-
cerns.  It is unable to address arbitrary discrimination and has a very small 
impact on distributive social justice. 
The property-based approach also has substantial negative impacts be-
cause the singling-out takings language reflects an inequality-of-results in-
quiry that steers courts, agencies, and landowners away from rational, non-
arbitrary decisionmaking and empowers factional mischief.  As a result, the 
singling-out language in the property-based approach works against its own 
goal. The language is unnecessary to provide the magnitude-of-burden pro-
tection and only serves to undermine the legitimacy and process values by 
promoting an inequality-of-results inquiry. 
B.  Strengths and Weaknesses of an Arbitrariness-Based Approach 
The arbitrariness-based approach, exemplified by the class-of-one doc-
trine, is simple in its focus and aims, and its simplicity provides both its great-
est strength as well as its limitation.  By focusing directly on arbitrary dis-
crimination, the approach addresses core singling-out concerns.  However, it 
has no ability to address magnitude-of-burdens or distributive-social-justice 
inquiries, and the degree of deference built into the inquiry also potentially 
allows some instances of disguised illegitimacy and political process failure 
to survive review. 
The arbitrariness-based approach takes direct aim at arbitrary discrimi-
nation, confronting core singling-out concerns head on.  For instance, by ask-
ing whether an individual “has been intentionally treated differently from 
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference 
in treatment,”182 the class-of-one doctrine looks for direct evidence of mani-
fest illegitimacy or political process failure.  Further, unlike the property-
based approach, the arbitrariness-based approach operates as articulated, of-
fers a suitable remedy for invalidating illegitimate actions, and does not pro-
mote behavior contrary to its goal.  As a result, it provides a simple inquiry 
suited to its ends. 
The major shortcoming of this simple approach, however, is that its 
fairly limited, face-value analysis will likely miss any legitimacy or political 
process defects not obvious at the surface level.  The arbitrariness-based in-
                                                          
 182.  See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
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quiry is really just a specialized version of rational basis review, which pro-
vides a great deference to governmental actors and thus a high hurdle for 
aggrieved parties to overcome.  As a result, it is not gauged for detecting 
factional mischief or majoritarian abuses that are disguised behind proffered 
rational and non-arbitrary justification.  Moreover, the arbitrariness-based ap-
proach has no means of inquiring into magnitude-of-burdens or distributive-
social-justice concerns unless they evidence some arbitrariness.  As a result, 
the arbitrary discrimination approach may be underprotective of legitimacy 
and political process concerns, particularly if strategic factions or majorities 
make even a minimum effort to mask abuses. 
Moreover, the simplicity of the arbitrariness-based inquiry may be de-
ceptive, as its indeterminate nature can prove difficult for courts to apply and 
unpredictable for litigants to follow.183  In determining whether an individual 
“has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 
that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment,”184 a court must 
define a class of similarly situated comparators and must assess the rational-
ity of treatment.  The highly factual nature of these two questions means that 
they are not easy to answer in a consistent or predictable manner.  Courts 
may differ on how broadly to define “similarly situated” and on what factors 
to stress.185  Additionally, even with a deferential rationality review, judges 
have a great deal of latitude—especially those that seek to ferret out poten-
tially hidden political process failures.  These challenges are frustrated by the 
current lack of precedential development for the arbitrariness-based ap-
proach, and while this will always be a case-specific inquiry, additional prec-
edential development can only assist in clarifying the analysis for the simi-
larly situated class, giving information on how probing the rationality review 
actually is, and adding overall predictability. 
In the end, the arbitrariness-based test may serve best as a backstop 
against obvious, non-nuanced singling out, but it will not catch every (or even 
most) instance of hidden process defects.  It may function, then, to police the 
relatively rare instances of blatant arbitrary discrimination, such as in Olech, 
thereby upholding a minimum standard of legitimacy that, thankfully, will 
frequently be met.  This may be all the arbitrary-discrimination test can hope 
to accomplish,186 so setting the expectations commensurate with the abilities 
of the arbitrariness-based approach may be all that can be asked for. 
                                                          
 183.  To be fair, the takings doctrine too is highly fact specific, difficult to apply, and unpredict-
able, so the property-based approach may be no better in this regard than the arbitrariness-based 
approach. 
 184.  Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 
 185.  For examples of how courts can differ on these issues, see supra note 57 and accompanying 
text. 
 186.  Some have argued for changing the law to offer a stricter standard of review in this area.  
See, e.g., Zoldan, supra note 19, at 693–96. 
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IV.  REFINING SINGLING OUT PROTECTIONS 
As the previous Parts discussed, the singling-out doctrines are not per-
fectly aligned to advance the underlying singling-out concerns.  The more 
common property-based approach leads to perverse outcomes that actually 
undermine singling-out protection, and the less common arbitrariness-based 
approach, though well suited to policing arbitrary discrimination, suffers 
from a lack of development.  This Part offers a counterintuitive suggestion 
for improving both approaches.  It suggests that refining the property-based 
approach to eliminate its singling-out language can actually aid both doc-
trines to better serve singling-out concerns without sacrificing substantive 
protections or creating precedential upheaval.  Moreover, it will aid in the 
administration of the takings doctrine. 
The core shortcoming of the property-based approach is the singling-
out language in the takings jurisprudence, which implies that courts will use 
an inequality-of-results inquiry in addition to a magnitude-of-burden inquiry.  
This leads to the counterproductive result that, in the name of policing gov-
ernment illegitimacy, the property-based approach encourages arbitrary gov-
ernment action rather than planning-based action.  The ironic solution is that 
courts can better serve core singling-out concerns over political process and 
legitimacy by eliminating the singling-out language from the property-based 
approach.  As a practical matter, this means excising the singling-out lan-
guage from the takings inquiry and expressly limiting the takings doctrine to 
policing magnitude of burdens, without the additional regard for inequality 
of results. 
Such a clarification would eliminate the perverse incentives of the prop-
erty-based approach while maintaining the same protection of private prop-
erty.  For example, by removing the inequality-of-results language, the Court 
could curtail opportunities for factional influence and regressive redistribu-
tion.  It would also reconcile courts’ announced and applied takings standards 
as well as rectify the problem of agencies acting arbitrarily to avoid inequality 
of results.  As a result, there would be no distorted treatment and inflated 
expectation in specially situated properties.  All the while, courts could con-
tinue applying the takings inquiry as they have to date, which has protected 
property rights from high-magnitude burdens with little or no actual attention 
to inequality of results.  With the effectively hollow singling-out takings lan-
guage eliminated, landowners would still be protected as before, and Execu-
tive Order 12630 would still foster a regulatory sympathy toward property 
rights. 
Moreover, all of the reasons offered to justify including singling-out 
language in the takings inquiry would still be satisfied even with the language 
removed.  For example, Justice Stevens championed the singling-out takings 
language based on the related concepts of reciprocity of advantage and of 
PappasFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  10:22 AM 
164 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:122 
generality.187  The idea of reciprocity of advantage is that a regulation may 
not only burden a property owner but also benefit her, say, by restricting other 
owners.  In such a case, the benefit may offset the burden and prevent a taking 
from arising.188  The concept of generality builds on this reciprocity of ad-
vantage notion by incorporating two considerations: 1) the reciprocity of ad-
vantage idea that takings determinations should account for both benefits and 
burdens of regulation, and 2) the political process idea that general regula-
tions offer some protection against special interests hijacking the regulatory 
process and unfairly concentrating burdens.189 
Eliminating the singling-out language from the takings inquiry sacri-
fices neither of these values because the takings inquiry, even absent the sin-
gling-out language, accounts for reciprocity of advantage while the arbitrar-
iness-based approach polices hijacking.  First, the takings inquiry is well-
suited to incorporate reciprocity of advantage considerations in calculating 
the magnitude of individual burdens.  The takings inquiry compares the situ-
ation of a property owner pre- and post-regulation, and an accurate post-reg-
ulation measure would include not only the regulatory costs but also any ben-
efits from the regulation.190  Second, an arbitrariness-based approach 
addresses hijacking concerns through policing arbitrary discrimination,191 
and it can do so more effectively than a takings-based approach which is dis-
abled from addressing arbitrary action.192 
Moreover, eliminating the singling-out language from the property-
based approach could also benefit the precedential development of arbitrari-
ness-based approaches such as the class-of-one doctrine.  To date, the prop-
erty-based approach to singling out has received more judicial attention and 
                                                          
 187.  See Echeverria, supra note 21, at 24; see also Echeverria, supra note 34, at 193. 
 188.  See Echeverria, supra note 34, at 192–93; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). 
 189.  See Echeverria, supra note 21, at 24; see also Echeverria, supra note 34, at 193. 
 190.  It may be difficult to calculate the exact “public value of government action” attributable 
to the specific reciprocity of advantage from a particular regulation as well as the general reciprocity 
of advantage from a broader set of regulations.  Echeverria, supra note 34, at 205; see also JOHN D. 
ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y INST., PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON 
MEASURE 37: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION’S HARM TO LANDOWNERS 10, 31–
32 (2007); Mark W. Cordes, Fairness and Farmland Preservation: A Response to Professor Rich-
ardson, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 371 (2005). 
 191.  Olech provides an example of policing such hijacking.  When the municipality demanded 
from Ms. Olech a thirty-three-foot easement, despite requiring only a fifteen-foot easement from 
other property owners seeking similar connections, the court protected against the arbitrary individ-
ual burden, and the demand of the additional eighteen feet in Olech could be described as regulatory 
hijacking or failure of the political process, and the class-of-one doctrine offered sufficient protec-
tion against just such occurrences.  See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563–65 (2000). 
 192.  See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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repetition, and this potentially diverts litigants and jurists toward the prop-
erty-based approach through precedential path dependence,193 thereby limit-
ing development of arbitrariness-based singling-out doctrines.  As a general 
matter, curtailing precedential development can result in loss of great public 
value.  As Owen Fiss has observed, doctrinal development allows judges “to 
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as 
the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into 
accord with them.”194  Such precedential development creates “public 
value”195 and a “public good” in the form of judicial opinions196 that provide 
“guidance for future conduct,”197 “impos[e] order and certainty on a transac-
tional world that would otherwise be in flux and chaos,”198 and “[create] legal 
norms that should inform people of the acceptable limits on their behav-
ior.”199  Moreover, “legal rules and precedents are valuable not only as a 
source of certainty, but also as a reasoned elaboration and visible expression 
of public values.”200  Accordingly, measures that reduce precedential devel-
opment “impoverish[] the development of law” by preventing judges from 
explicating and developing constitutional and statutory texts.201  When prec-
edential development is stifled, then stifled also are the law’s functions of 
“providing norms,” “providing future guidance for others similarly situated,” 
and “building a body of decisions for use both directly and by analogy.”202  
Additionally, “[t]he loss of substantive law from the public realm distorts the 
legal landscape, limits public testing and debate of legal norms, and devalues 
or destroys institutional competencies.”203 
The property-based singling-out language can limit doctrinal develop-
ment of the arbitrariness-based approach, particularly when the property-
based approach is so much more frequently invoked.  Thus, the frequent rep-
etition of the singling-out language in the takings context not only results in 
perverse incentives and fails to guard against arbitrary discrimination but also 
                                                          
 193.  See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 234 (1999); Maxwell L. Stearns, 
Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1349 & 
n.121 (1995). 
 194.  Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). 
 195.  Lederman, supra note 193, at 222 (citing Fiss, supra note 194, at 1073). 
 196.  See id. at 227. 
 197.  Id.; see also, e.g., H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 
431, 433 (1986). 
 198.  David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2623 
(1995). 
 199.  Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
 200.  Luban, supra note 198, at 2626. 
 201.  Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and Administrative 
Law, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 214 (2015). 
 202.  Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 199, at 14. 
 203.  Id. at 2. 
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risks curtailing development of the class-of-one doctrine.204  For example, the 
class-of-one doctrine shows signs of being starved of precedential develop-
ment in the Supreme Court.  Though lower courts have struggled to apply the 
class-of-one doctrine,205 since Olech was decided in 2000, the Supreme Court 
has heard only one class-of-one case, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Ag-
riculture.206  During that same time period, the Court has decided ten takings 
cases207 and endorsed the Armstrong singling-out principle in four of them.208  
While these four takings cases did not turn on Armstrong’s singling-out tak-
ings language, and it would be overly simplistic to say that each of these 
could have deeply developed the class-of-one doctrine, the difference be-
tween the Court’s attention to the two doctrines offers some indication of a 
tendency by the Court to address singling out in the takings context at the 
expense of the equal protection context.209 
For all of these benefits, expunging singling-out language from the tak-
ings inquiry comes with little cost.  In fact, the Court could accomplish this 
without causing much doctrinal change at all.  The Court could simply an-
nounce that the singling-out language that has been used in the takings con-
text was a misarticulation and that the singling-out principle more properly 
belongs in an arbitrariness-based inquiry.  This would not cause a major shift 
in practice since the singling-out language, while often repeated, is not the 
linchpin for takings decisions.210  Nor would this disturb the primary magni-
tude-of-burden inquiry that the takings decisions rely on because that inquiry 
                                                          
 204.  For an argument about similar stifling of doctrinal development, see Mark A. Graber, Sub-
traction by Addition?: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 
1505 (2012) (suggesting that the Slaughter-House Cases cut off the jurisprudential development of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause by displacing fundamental rights protections into the Due 
Process Clause). 
 205.  See supra note 57. 
 206.  553 U.S. 591 (2008). 
 207.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Horne v. Dep’t of 
Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 
(2012); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010); 
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005); Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
For a summary of the cases decided as of December 2013, see ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 3–4 (Jul. 
20, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-122.pdf. 
 208.  Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537; Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 303–04; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618.  While Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Mgmt. Dist. cites Armstrong, it is in reference to its underlying facts rather than for the 
Armstrong principle.  133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013). 
 209.  Cf. Davidson supra note 23, at 37–38; Pappas, supra note 42, at 37, 39 (discussing cases 
in which the Court has incorporated “discrimination” or equal protection reasoning into its takings 
analysis). 
 210.  See discussion supra Part III.A.4. 
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is not premised on singling out.  Additionally, it would not appreciably alter 
the application of the major takings tests from Penn Central, Loretto, or Lu-
cas, and it would even help to clarify the third prong of Penn Central, which 
has caused much confusion in terms of whether it incorporates a singled-out 
inquiry and, if so, how that is to be applied.211 In the end, such a change would 
not call for an overhaul of takings law, just a tune-up. 
In fact, the Court provided a similar doctrinal clarification to the takings 
inquiry in Lingle, which distinguished an arbitrariness-based inquiry from the 
takings inquiry and provides a model for excising imprecise singling-out lan-
guage from takings law.  In Lingle, the Court held that the substantive due 
process inquiry was distinct from the takings inquiry and that past precedent 
conflating the two, particularly Agins v. City of Tiburon,212 was “not a valid 
method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment re-
quires just compensation.”213  The Court could follow a similar course by 
expressly announcing that singling-out inquiries are distinct from the magni-
tude-of-burden focused takings measure and that past precedent conflating 
the two incorrectly states the test for identifying regulatory takings for which 
the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation.214 
Administering doctrines to address singling-out concerns is a challeng-
ing undertaking.  The nature of policing for illegitimate government actions 
is inherently difficult because it involves second-guessing political results 
and searching for more or less hidden political process failures.  This will 
always run up against questions of deference to proffered justifications for 
government actions and uncertain, fact specific inquiries will abound, 
whether under the property-based inquiry or the arbitrariness-based inquiry.  
Bright-line predictability may be impossible in this area.215  Nonetheless, 
eliminating singling-out language from the takings inquiry will add needed 
precision to the singling-out approaches and go a long way to addressing 
avoidable shortcomings that result from the currently confused inquiry.  
Moreover, the change would be relatively simple to execute since the blue-
print for doing so already exists in Lingle.  Removing the singling-out lan-
guage from the takings inquiry would allow the respective property-based 
and arbitrariness-based approaches to play to their comparative advantages, 
add clarity, make for easier and more consistent administration by courts and 
                                                          
 211.  Cf. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545 (“We emphasize that our holding today—that the ‘substantially 
advances’ formula is not a valid takings test—does not require us to disturb any of our prior hold-
ings.”). 
 212.  447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 213.  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. 
 214.  Davidson similarly “argues for situating the concerns addressed by the equality dimension 
of regulatory takings in the equal protection jurisprudence as clearly as the Lingle Court reconciled 
regulatory takings and substantive due process.”  Davidson, supra note 23, at 38. 
 215.  It may never be possible. 
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agencies, remove perverse land-use incentives, and better protect specially 
situated properties. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Concerns over government legitimacy and functional political processes 
underscore the protection of individuals from being singled out, however, the 
implementation of singling-out protection has done these concerns a disser-
vice.  Currently, singling-out doctrines give center stage to a misleading 
property-based approach that regurgitates hollow language, promotes arbi-
trary decisionmaking, distorts property management, and hampers the devel-
opment of more appropriate arbitrariness-based doctrines.  As a solution, this 
Article urges the Supreme Court to explicitly abandon the singling-out lan-
guage from the takings inquiry to clarify that its protections shield individuals 
from arbitrary discrimination and high-magnitude burdens, but not from gen-
eral inequality of results. 
 
 
